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As the UNESCO (2005a) points out in their World Report 2005, we live in a knowledge 
society as the outcome of the third industrial revolution driven by new technologies 
such as information technology and globalization. As indication that knowledge 
creation became more and more important for firms, the UNESCO (2005b) documents 
in its Science Report 2005 that industrial funds for research and development in the 
U.S. had an annual growth rate of 5.6 percent from 1953 to 2001 (in constant dollar 
terms). Gera and Mang (1998), for instance, show for Canadian firms that between 1971 
and 1991 the Canadian industrial structure has become more knowledge-based and 
technology-intensive and competitive advantage stems from innovations and ideas.  
Part of the current knowledge society is a learning society in which the people never 
stop learning, i.e., internalizing knowledge (UNSECO, 2005a). Economic literature 
denotes learning as human capital acquisition (e.g., Prendergast, 1993). Jorgenson and 
Fraumeni (1989), for instance, document that the share of investments in human capital 
relative to all investments (both human and nonhuman capital investments) in the 
United States from 1949 to 1984 is always more than 80 percent. In addition, Gera and 
Mang (1998) show that in Canada the service industry where human capital is dominant 
as production factor has experienced the highest growth rates in gross output than any 
other industry between 1971 and 1991.  
Since human capital is an intangible asset of the firm (Brynjolfsson et al., 2002), but 
cannot be recognized on the balance sheet (Coenenberg et al., 2012), firm’s market 
capitalization is usually greater than their book value of equity (e.g. Chan et al., 1999; 
Hall, 2001). 
These findings suggest that firms’ economic success depends strongly on human 
capital.1 Economic literature, however, identify some problems that make it difficult for 
firms and employees to profit from human capital.  
                                                 
1 Consistently, the OECD (1996) ascertains that the knowledge management including its creation, 
acquisition, transfer, and exploitation drives economic performance that is addressed by the knowledge 
management literature (e.g. Polanyi, 1966; Nonaka, 1994, Davenport and Prusak, 1999; Ambrosini and 
Bowman, 2001; Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001). 
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This dissertation is designed to shed light on how firms design incentives and jobs to 
solve these problems firms encounter during the lifecycle of human capital: At the 
beginning, an employee can acquire two types of human capital (Becker, 1962): First, it 
can be firm-specific so that the employee cannot utilize it in other firms. Second, it can 
be general so that he can utilize it in other firms. To illustrate both types, I assume a 
young professional who starts his career in a firm after graduating at university where 
he likely acquired general human capital. In the firm, however, he undergoes trainings 
in his first month to get equipped with firm-specific skills (i.e., firm-specific human 
capital acquisition). 
If the young professional acquires firm-specific human capital, a dual moral hazard 
problem can arise if such human capital is nonverifiable (Prendergast, 1993, Kahn and 
Huberman, 1988): On the one hand, if the young professional invests in nonverifiable 
firm-specific human capital, the firm may extract rents from this specific investment by, 
for example, not compensating him for it. It is possible because such compensation is 
not enforceable before a court and hence the firm cannot credibly commit to it. On the 
other hand, if the firm pays for such human capital acquisition, the young professional 
has no incentive to subsequently acquire it.  
On the contrary, if human capital is general, Becker (1962) states that the firm is not 
willing to pay for it because the employee can leave the firm (see for this inalienability 
of human capital argument, for instance, Hart and Moore, 1994) and then can utilize it 
in another firm. Regarding the young professional, it is unlikely that the firm pays his 
university tuition fees. These problems raise the following research question: 
RQ1: How do firms motivate their employees to acquire firm-specific and 
general human capital? 
Chapter 2 of the dissertation addresses this research question by exploring empirically 
how incentive design including promotion incentives and performance pay is related to 
firm-specific and general human capital acquisition. Consistent with Prendergast 
(1993), if nonverifiable human capital is firm-specific and leads to higher employee’s 
productivity on the next job he is promoted to, I document a positive relation of 
promotion incentives with such human capital acquisition. On the contrary, I find no 
relation of individual performance pay and its acquisition.  
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In addition, if human capital is general, I document a positive relation of individual 
performance pay to its acquisition and no relation of promotion incentives to its 
acquisition.  
Once the young professional has acquired human capital, the firm and even the 
employee himself face the problem to evaluate it properly. This problem, for instance, 
occurs if the firm aims to assign an employee to a job in which he can utilize his human 
capital in the most profitable way. Consequently, Chapter 3 of the dissertation addresses 
the following research question: 
RQ2: How do firms learn about employees’ human capital? 
Consistent with Ortega (2001) who shows theoretically that job rotation as one 
component of job design enables the firm to learn about employees’ job-specific human 
capital, I find empirically that firm’s uncertainty about employees’ job-specific human 
capital is positively related to the adoption of job rotation. Further, I document that the 
firm also adopts job rotation if it is uncertain about job-specific nonhuman capital or if 
employees’ job performance is influenced by an exogenous shock. 
After several years in the firm, the formerly young professional has acquired a lot of 
valuable human capital. Since the firm has learned about its high value after rotating 
him with others on different jobs, the firm promotes him to the CEO position. As CEO, 
he faces discretion because he knows best how to utilize his human capital to optimize 
firm performance (Prendergast, 2002; Ortega, 2009). Corporate governance literature, 
however, finds that such discretion also enables the CEO to misappropriate firm’s assets 
rather than add value to the firm (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Consequently, Chapter 4 of the dissertation addresses the following research question: 
RQ3: How do firms alleviate moral hazard problems caused by CEOs’ 
discretion due to their high value of human capital? 
A recent strand of literature about so-called internal governance addresses such moral 
hazard problems by examining a situation in which a subordinated manager disciplines 
a myopic CEO to invest in the firm rather than privately consume firm resources (Fama, 
1980; Acharya et al., 2011). 
Acharya et al. (2011) explore theoretically the following mechanism: The CEO depends 
on cash flows provided by a subordinated manager who will become the next CEO in 
the future. As a result of such promotion incentives, he is motivated to provide cash 
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flows before getting promoted if the current CEO undertakes long-term investments 
whose return the manager can appropriate when he is CEO. They predict that CEO’s 
contribution to firm’s cash flows must neither be very small nor very large to maximize 
firm value under this mechanism of internal governance. Consistent with their findings, 
I document empirically in selected S&P 500 firms that the relation of firm’s long-term 
investments and CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows is hump-shaped.  
In addition, I find that internal governance is more effective (i.e., aforementioned hump-
shaped relation is more pronounced) if the CEO is likely myopic.  




Promotion Incentives, Performance Pay, and Human 
Capital Acquisition 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides empirical evidence how promotion incentives and performance 
pay are related to nonverifiable human capital acquisition contingent on its grade of 
firm specificity.2 If human capital is nonverifiable, courts, for instance, cannot observe 
and cannot assess it and thus cannot enforce any contract on it (Prendergast, 1993). If 
human capital is firm-specific3 an employee can utilize it only in the same firm (Becker, 
1962). Thus, its previous acquisition reflects a specific investment by the employee in 
his firm. To illustrate this, I assume an engineer who takes additional trainings in his 
leisure time to acquire firm-specific skills about new production processes (i.e., 
nonverifiable firm-specific human capital).  
According to Prendergast (1993) and Kahn and Huberman (1988), this situation may 
cause a dual moral hazard problem as follows: First, the engineer’s firm cannot credibly 
commit to future compensation for such human capital because it is able to behave 
opportunistically and extract rents from the engineer’s specific investment: It can, for 
instance, reduce the sensitivity of his performance pay on his measured output.4 This is 
possible because compensation contingent on such human capital is not enforceable 
before a court due to its nonverifiability and the engineer cannot utilize that human 
capital elsewhere because of its firm-specificity. Second, the firm can pay for the 
training: The engineer, for instance, gets days off for the training. Then, the employee 
can behave opportunistically by using training time for private activities rather than 
training because once his firm has paid for it he has no incentive to subsequently 
acquire it.  
                                                 
2 Some analysis in this chapter is based partially on a research project with Patrick Göttner. 
3 Alternative concepts of specific human capital in the literature: Task-specific (Gibbons and Waldman, 
2004), industry-specific (Neal, 1995), vintage-specific (Violante, 2002), occupation-specific 
(Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009), and job-specific (e.g., Kwon, 2006). 
4 For a discussion see Prendergast and Topel (1993). For an example see Cheatham et al. (1996) who 
report about the film industry that studios adjust accounting figures to be able to renege on writers’ 
compensation contracts that are contingent on the economic success of their movies measured by those 
accounting figures.  
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Addressing that dual moral hazard problem, Prendergast (1993) predicts in his 
theoretical model that an employee acquires nonverifiable firm-specific human capital 
through trainings only if he gets promoted to another job with a higher wage level. 
Then, the higher wage level is the compensation for preceding human capital 
acquisition. That compensation is feasible because the firm can credibly commit to it by 
assigning it to jobs rather than directly to certain human capital. Prendergast (1993) 
predicts that promotion incentives are only effective if the training leads to higher 
employee’s productivity on the next job rather than on the current job. 
Consistently, empirical analysis in this Chapter documents that promotion incentives are 
positively related to nonverifiable firm-specific human capital acquisition whereas 
individual performance pay (i.e., piece rates or productivity payments) is not related to 
such acquisition. Following Becker (1962), I identify nonverifiable firm-specific human 
capital acquisition as employer-provided or -paid training that likely improves 
employee’s productivity more on the next job than on the current job. 
Subsequently, if human capital is general rather than firm-specific, i.e., can also be 
utilized in other firms (Becker, 1962), I hypothesize that individual performance pay is 
feasible because the employee can threaten the firm to leave if it does not commit to 
future compensation for such human capital. Consistently, I find that individual 
performance pay is positively related to such general human capital acquisition. 
All my findings are robust against model specification concerns. Moreover, I compare 
my results to results with on-the-job training. Further, I discuss findings about 
alternative performance pay schemes such as a profit sharing plan and equity 
compensation. 
My study contributes to the strand of human capital literature that addresses incentives 
for human capital acquisition (e.g., Siemsen et al., 2005; Hashimoto, 1979). To my 
knowledge, this study is the first which documents Prendergast’s (1993) model 
predictions about the relation of promotion incentives and nonverifiable firm-specific 
human capital acquisition. The positive relation of human capital acquisition and 
promotion incentives is also reflected in Lazear and Rosen’s (1981) statement as 
follows: ‘A contest provides the proper incentives for skill acquisition prior to coming 
into the position’. Besides, I also analyze individual performance pay. Since I 
differentiate between two grades of specificity of human capital, I complement some 
15 
studies about human capital acquisition that do not take specificity and its implication 
on the provision of performance pay into account. Siemsen et al. (2005), for instance, 
predict in their theoretical model that human capital acquisition increases with 
individual performance pay while not taking specificity into account. Hashimoto (1979) 
shows theoretically and empirically that human capital acquisition through on-the-job 
training is related to individual performance pay but does not address its specificity.  
My findings also contribute to the knowledge management literature (e.g. Polanyi, 
1966; Nonaka, 1994, Davenport and Prusak, 1999; Ambrosini and Bowman, 2001; 
Tsoukas and Vladimirou, 2001) by documenting which incentives firms provide if 
knowledge internalization (i.e., human capital acquisition) is required and if such 
knowledge is nonverifiable and firm-specific or general. 
For my study, I choose a sample of 22,788 employees from the Fourth and Fifth 
European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) conducted in 2005 and 2010, 
respectively. My sample is not restricted to a single firm (Gibbs, 1995), industry (Grund 
and Kräkel, 2012), group of similar jobs (Kwon, 2006; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992), 
country, or years. As an advantage, this enables me to control for job and employee 
heterogeneity. An additional methodological advantage of my study is the proxy 
variable for the provision of promotion incentives: It reflects prospects for career 
advancement perceived by the employee who knows which next job he is eligible for. 
On the contrary, the literature usually choose the prize (wage spread) as proxy for 
promotion incentives and does not control for the case that the employee is, in fact, 
eligible for the job for which the prize is calculated (e.g., Kale et al., 2009; Gibbs, 1995; 
De Varo, 2006; Kwon, 2006). Moreover, my approach makes it easy to cope with the 
large heterogeneity of employees in my sample because I do not need to identify the 
corresponding prize of the next job the employee is eligible for. Consequently, I expect 
that my proxy variable is less noisy in measuring promotion incentives than the prize 
variable because the former refers more likely to the next job.  
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2 I formulate my 
hypotheses based on Prendergast’s (1993) model. Section 3 describes the sample and 
variable and model specifications. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Section 5 
provides robustness analyses. Section 6 concludes and presents some suggestions for 
future research.  
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2.2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Addressing the aforementioned dual moral hazard problem, Prendergast (1993) 
demonstrates theoretically that promotion incentives induce the employee to acquire 
nonverifiable firm-specific human capital through training under two conditions. First, 
such human capital increases productivity more on the next job than on the current job. 
Second, it is firm-specific because then the firm commits itself credibly to compensate 
for such acquisition by paying a higher wage on the next job.5 
He models an employee who can train to acquire skills and the firm can assign him to 
two different jobs, an easy and a difficult job. The employee’s ability before training is 
not known by the firm and the employee. Further, he assumes that low ability 
employees fit better to the easy job whereas high ability employees to the difficult job. 
After training the firm can observe employee’s ability and decides on whether or not it 
assigns him to the difficult job that is considered a promotion.  
Further, Prendergast (1993) assumes if the employee is promoted to the difficult job, he 
gets a higher wage that is regarded as compensation for such training.6 He shows that 
the firm is willing to pay the higher wage if the employee is more productive on the 
difficult job after the training and such productivity increase outweighs the higher costs 
the firm incurs by the higher wage. Then, the firm is better off to promote him because 
it maximizes its profits. Consequently, the employee is induced to train because the firm 
is able to commit credibly to the higher wage as compensation for training. 
To illustrate this, consider the production engineer who learns how to steer a new 
robotic arm. If he is promoted to a supervisor position, that skill does not increase his 
productivity as supervisor because he will not use the robotic arm any more. Hence, the 
firm does not profit from the training and is willing neither to promote him to the 
position nor to pay a higher wage than the wage in the engineer’s previous job. Since 
the engineer anticipates it, he will not train. Consequently, employee’s productivity 
must increase sufficiently more in the next job than in the current job to render 
promotion incentives effective.  
                                                 
5 He abstracts from reputation or relational contracts as means against firm’s opportunistic behavior (e.g., 
Bull, 1987; Baker et. al., 2002). 
6 In the literature about promotion incentives such as Lazear and Rosen (1981) the wage spread as 
difference of the higher wage on the next job and lower wage on the current job is denoted as the prize. 
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Moreover, Prendergast (1993) concludes that a simple change in the employee’s job 
title such as from a consultant to a senior consultant cannot provide incentives for 
training because there is no change in employee’s productivity after training so that the 
firm does not earn more and due to this has no reason to pay a higher wage.  
Consequently, I formulate my first hypothesis: 
H1: The provision of promotion incentives is positively related to nonverifiable firm-
specific human capital acquisition that increases employee’s productivity on the next 
job sufficiently more than on the current job. 
Subsequently, I relax Prendergast’s (1993) assumption of firm-specific human capital 
and analyze general human capital. According to Becker (1962), human capital is 
general if the employee can also utilize it in other firms. Then, the firm can credibly 
commit to future compensation schemes such as individual performance pay because 
the employee threatens the firm to leave the firm if it reneges on it. Hence, an individual 
performance pay contract is feasible reflected by my second hypothesis: 
H2: The provision of individual performance pay is positively related to nonverifiable 
general human capital acquisition. 
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2.3 Sample description and specification of variables and 
models 
2.3.1 Sample description  
I use cross-national data from the Fourth and Fifth European Working Conditions 
Survey (EWCS)7 conducted in 2005 (4th) and 2010 (5th) by the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions along residents of the EU and other 
European countries aged above 15.8 
The surveys consist of questionnaire-based interviews at the homes of the respondents 
from 35 countries9. They aim at giving insight into the European working environment 
and concern areas as communication and management structures, work-life balance, 
organization of work, and payment structures.  
Response rates are 44.2 percent (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions 2010) and 47 percent (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2005), respectively. 
The original data sample contains 73,496 observations. I exclude state institutions, 
industries referring to armed forces or household activities because in those cases 
compensation structures are different from private, profit-oriented firms. Furthermore, I 
exclude self-employed and non-employed respondents. After exclusion of missing 
values, I am left with a set of 25,645 valid cases. For my main analyses, I restrict the 
sample to 22,788 employees who have been working at least for one year in their firm.10 
Due to the random route selection and the large number of observations, I do not expect 
that the same respondent or firm is contained twice in the sample which guarantees that 
there are no cluster effects regarding a respondent or firm. Moreover the random route 
selection makes any selection bias unlikely. 
                                                 
7 Data is publicly available on http://www.eurofound.europa.eu 
8 The Fourth and the antecedent EWCSs have been used in several studies: Nienhüser and 
Matiaske (2006) study the compensation of temporary agency workers in European firms. Daniels et 
al. (2007) investigate the interdependence between job discretion and health outcomes. Ortega (2009) 
uses the data to analyze the relation between job discretion and performance pay. In Chapter three I also 
use EWCS data for an empirical study about the employer learning argument of job rotation. 
9 The countries include EU-27 countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) 
and Norway, Croatia, Turkey, Switzerland, Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo 
and Montenegro. 
10 As robustness analysis, I also analyze the entire sample. 
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2.3.2 Specification of variables 
2.3.2.1 Proxy variable for firm-specific human capital acquisition 
As proxy for nonverifiable firm-specific human capital acquisition, I choose the binary 
variable EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING which is set to ‘1’ if the employee has 
undertaken a training which his employer has provided or paid for over the 12 months 
preceding the date of the interview.11 
In the aforementioned example, the engineer attends a training about new production 
processes that is presented by the Chief Technology Officer of the firm. 
This type of training is related to firm-specific human capital because Becker (1962) 
states that the firm is only willing to pay for firm-specific human capital acquisition. 
Further, I assume that this type of training reflects human capital that improves 
employee’s productivity more on the next job than on the current job.12 
2.3.2.2 Proxy variable for nonverifiable general human capital acquisition 
As proxy for general human capital acquisition, I choose the binary variable 
EMPLOYEE_PAID_TRAINING which is set to ‘1’ if the employee has undertaken a 
training which he paid himself for over the 12 months preceding the date of the 
interview. Becker (1962) assigns the term ‘general human capital’ to human capital that 
the employee pays for. The firm is not willing to pay for it because the employee can 
leave the firm and profit elsewhere from that human capital while the firm cannot 
benefit from it. 
Regarding the example, employee-paid training occurs if the engineer pays for taking 
engineering classes at university which teach him engineering skills that enhances his 
job performance in his firm but can also be utilized in other firms.  
It is noteworthy that I do not assume that general human capital acquisition is verifiable. 
It is only essential that other firms are also able to use it. This does not necessarily mean 
that a court can assess it. To support this assumption, I argue as follows: The engineer’s 
new skills, for instance, cannot likely be assessed by a court represented by judges who 
studied law. I doubt that the judges can trust other firms which can verify those skills. 
The reason for it is that other firms as competitors of the employee’s current firm are 
                                                 
11 All variable definitions are described in Table 2.7 in the appendix of this Chapter. 
12 I return to empirical evidence about this assumption in the empirical results Section and robustness 
analysis Section. 
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likely reluctant to reveal the true value of employee’s human capital because if they do 
so, the court can enforce compensation for those skills and due to this the employee 
does not need to leave his current firm and join them. 
2.3.2.3 Proxy variables for incentives of interest 
Promotion incentives 
As proxy variable for the provision of promotion incentives, I choose the variable 
PROM_INCENTIVES that is based on the question ‘My job offers good prospects for 
career advancement.’ Its values range from ‘0’ (‘strongly disagree’) to ‘4’ (‘strongly 
agree’) on a five-step metric scale. As aforementioned, I deviate from the existing 
literature with this measure because I do not use the prize (wage spread) as the proxy for 
promotion incentives (e.g., Kale et al., 2009; Kwon, 2006; Gibbs, 1995; De Varo, 2006; 
Bognanno, 2001) but employee’s perception of them. This approach makes it easy to 
cope with the substantial heterogeneity of employees in my sample because I do not 
need to identify the corresponding prize of the next job each employee is eligible for.  
Individual performance pay 
As individual performance pay I regard the provision of piece rates or productivity 
payments. So, I define a binary variable, INDV_PPAY, whose value is ‘1’ if the 
employee’s remuneration includes ’piece rate or productivity payments’.  
Though my sample also includes data about group-based performance pay such as a 
profit sharing plan and equity compensation, I choose individual performance pay for 
testing my hypothesis because it is at least noisy in reflecting employee’s performance 
and value of his human capital (Holmström, 1982). Then, the firm learns very well 
about the impact of recently-acquired human capital on employee’s performance and 
thus can behave opportunistically by, for example, increasing performance objectives or 
using creative accounting for performance measurement.13 
Besides, if the firm can commit to future individual performance pay, it does not suffer 
from free-riding by the employee as group-based performance pay does (Holmström, 
1982). The ratchet effect literature such as Weitzman (1980) and Freixas et al. (1985) 
supports my assumption that the firm is likely to renege on future individual 
                                                 
13 Creative accounting, for instance, is less possible for firm-wide performance measurement because I 
expect that shareholders and other stakeholders usually scrutinize firm performance measurement.  
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performance pay if it has learnt about task productivity and due to this employee’s 
productivity. 
2.3.2.4 Control variables 
Since the sample is very heterogeneous, it is important to include several control 
variables which can be correlated with promotion incentives, individual performance 
pay and the training variables. 
To begin with, I control for alternative incentives: I define the dummy variable 
PROFIT_SHARE (i.e., profit sharing plan) with value ‘1’ if the employee’s 
remuneration includes ‘payments based on the overall performance of the company 
where [he] works’. If his remuneration includes ‘income from shares in the company 
[he] works for’, I set the dummy variable EQUITY_COMP (i.e., equity compensation) 
to ‘1’. 
I include the dummy variable COMPLEX_TASKS whose value of ‘1’ indicates if the 
job contains complex tasks. Ortega (2009) documents empirically a positive relation 
between job complexity and the provision of performance pay. Kettenring et al. (2014) 
show that the provision of promotion incentives and complexity are positively 
correlated. 
To control for uncertainty about already-acquired human capital, I include a five-step 
scaled variable, OWN_IDEAS measuring how much the employee ‘can apply his own 
ideas’.14 
I include ISCO_X dummy variables reflecting the International Standard Classification 
of Occupations code X to control for employee’s type of occupation.  
Since I assign managerial skills to human capital,15 I control for it by the binary variable 
SUBORDINATES that exhibits a value of ‘1’ if the employee has at least one 
subordinate and by the dummy variable ISCO_1 representing management positions.  
I also include ISCED_X as an indicator for the level X of education according to the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) code. Hereby, I follow 
                                                 
14 See for a more detailed discussion and analysis of OWN_IDEAS Chapter 3. 
15 I assume that managerial skills are also utilizable after being promoted to the next rank. So, it is general 
human capital in the sense of Becker (1962). An indication of this can be found in Oyer and 
Schaefer (2005) who state that managers can change firms easily due to similar accounting standards and 
information systems across firms. Besides, personal knowledge about senior’s subordinates might get lost 
after his promotion because his subordinates change. In this case, managerial skills also belong to human 
capital specific to the current job. 
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several studies which use the level of education as a proxy for employee’s ability (see, 
e.g., Gibbs, 1995; Kwon, 2006; De Varo, 2006) which I regard as general human 
capital. I begin with level 3 which represents upper secondary education and leave the 
levels 0-2 to the constant. 
Additionally, I interpret the level of education as proxy for employee’s private human 
capital acquisition costs. My argument is that a better-educated employee is able to 
acquire human capital less costly in comparison to her worse-educated peer group: An 
unskilled worker with no high school degree must, for instance, exert more effort to 
earn a MBA degree than an employee with a bachelor degree. Following this argument, 
I expect that a higher level of education is related to a higher probability of human 
capital acquisition. 
In line with other studies about incentives (e.g., Gibbs, 1995; De Varo, 2006; Kwon 
2006; Baker et al., 1994), I include firm tenure, TENURE. In the literature, it is usually 
used as a proxy for firm-specific human capital that has been acquired up to date. 
If an employee approaches retirement age, promotion incentives will lose their 
effectiveness because the promotion chance is, then, very low (e.g., Gibbons and 
Murphy, 1992; De Varo, 2006). Therefore, I add employee’s age represented by AGE 
and its squared version, AGE*AGE, as control variables to address nonlinearity in this 
variable. 
I also account for potential female-male differences in compensation structure and 
include the respondent’s gender as variable, GENDER. 
To control for the possibility that measurement of individual output is not possible and 
consequently the provision of performance pay is less likely, I include ASSESSMENT 
as a binary variable carrying ‘1’ if the employee’s work performance have been 
assessed formally and regularly in the previous twelve months and ‘0’ otherwise. In 
addition, I include the dummy variable QUALITY_STANDARDS that measures if the 
employee must meet ‘precise quality standards’ that also controls for measurability of 
performance. 
For several reasons, I also include a variable, ROTATING_TASKS, indicating if the 
employee rotates tasks. First, it can be correlated with promotion incentives because 
task rotation as proxy variable for job rotation is regarded as mechanism to learn skills 
for career advancement (Saari et al., 1988). Second, it can be correlated with individual 
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performance pay and training variables because firms may use it to commit credibly to 
compensation contracts consistent with Ickes and Samuelson (1987) who show 
theoretically that job rotation mitigates the ratchet effect that also relates to the problem 
that firms may renege on individual performance pay contracts. Third, task rotation can 
help the firm to assess human capital (Ortega, 2009) so that is can be correlated to 
training variables. 
I construct a variable for noise, NOISE, which expresses the intensity of job 
interruptions which has different effects on the optimal use of incentives (e.g. Lazear 
and Rosen, 1981; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  
Since the fundamental problem of multi-tasking described by Holmström and 
Milgrom (1991) occurs if an employee has at least one other job besides his main job, I 
expect higher likelihood of provision of incentives that are supposed to induce the 
employee to concentrate on the main job. I control for the existence of other jobs 
represented by the binary variable OTHER_JOBS.  
Furthermore, I address different development levels of education and economic systems 
among the European countries by including country dummies, COUNTRY_X. 
Moreover, I control for the size of the workplace/local unit of establishment with 
UNIT_SIZE_X.16 
In order to take into consideration different levels of risk, earnings and regulations 
across industries, I include industry dummies according the NACE (i.e. in French: 
Nomenclature Statistique des Activités Economiques dans la Communauté Européenne) 
code.  
Since my sample contains observations either from 2005 or 2010, I control for time 
effects by including a year dummy variable, YEAR2010, into the model. For example, 
in a bad economic environment the provision of promotion incentives is less likely than 
in good economic times. 
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics  
Descriptive statistics of my variables of interest including the mean and the standard 
deviation for my main sample of 22,788 employees are shown in Table 2.1.  
                                                 
16 The corresponding question addresses the size of the local establishment or workplace so that it can 
only be regarded as lower bound of the real firm size. In spite of this drawback, Ortega (2009) also uses 
these variables in his regression models and European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions (2010) interpret it as firm size in its survey. 
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Promotion incentives are on average with a value of 1.680 below the midpoint of its 
scale of 2 indicating that the majority of employees are not optimistic about further 
career advancement and thus unlikely overstate answers to that question. 
The most frequently provided type of pecuniary incentives is individual performance 
pay (INDV_PPAY) such as piece rates or productivity payments (15.0 percent) 
followed by a profit sharing plan (14.2 percent), whereas equity compensation is rare 
(3.5 percent).  
Employer-provided trainings (EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING) are prevalent 
(28.8 percent) while employee-paid trainings (EMPLOYEE_PAID_TRAINING) are 
rare (4.6 percent).  
Noise at the workplace (NOISE) with a mean of 1.26 seems to be low on average 
relative to a midpoint of its scale of 1.5.  
58.9 percent have complex tasks and 48.4 percent rotate tasks. OWN_IDEAS with a 
mean of 2.41 relative to the midpoint of its scale of 2 shows that the majority of all 
employees is able to apply its own ideas.  
Performance of 39.9 percent of the employees has been assessed regularly and 76.4 
percent must meet precise quality standards. 6.2 percent of all employees are managers 
(ISCO 1) and 16.9 percent have subordinates.  
55.8 percent of the employees are male with an average age of 40.1 years who have 
been working in the firm for 9.1 years on average. 
The most (least) employees live in Belgium (7.0 percent) (Albania (0.5 percent)), work 
in NACE 2, i.e. manufacturing and mining sector (27.1 percent) (NACE 3, i.e. 
electricity, gas and water supply sector (1.4 percent)), are service worker, shop and 
market sales worker (17.6 percent) (skilled agricultural and fishery workers (0.9 
percent)) and completed upper secondary education (45.3 percent) (second stage of 
tertiary education (1.0 percent)). Most of employees (32.5 percent) work in a workplace 
with 10 and 49 employees whereas the least of them (2.2 percent) in a workplace with 
one employee. Only 6.6 percent of all employees have other jobs than their main job. 
61.7 percent of observations were made in 2010. 
I estimate a Pearson correlation matrix of all independent variables to check for 
multicollinearity problems (shown in Table 2.2). I measure neither any correlation 
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coefficients among variables of interest above critical levels of 0.8 (see for a thorough 
analysis about multicollinearity Mason and Perreault, 1991) nor variance inflation 
factors (vif) for the variables of interest below the critical value of 10 (Kennedy, 2008), 
So, I conclude that my analyses do not suffer from multicollinearity problems 
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics. Variables are defined as described in Table 2.7. 
Entire sample (N = 22,788) 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING 0.288 0.453 
EMPLOYEE_PAID_TRAINING 0.046 0.210 
ON_THE_JOB_TRAINING 0.315 0.464 
PROM_INCENTIVES 1.680 1.193 
INDV_PPAY 0.150 0.357 
PROFIT_SHARE 0.142 0.349 
EQUITY_COMP 0.035 0.184 
JOB_LOSS_PROB 1.305 1.218 
QUALITY_STANDARDS 0.764 0.425 
COMPLEX_TASKS 0.589 0.492 
OWN_IDEAS 2.409 1.377 
ROTATING_TASKS 0.484 0.500 
AGE 40.083 11.430 
TENURE 9.127 8.801 
ISCED_0_2 0.249 0.432 
ISCED_3 0.453 0.498 
ISCED_4 0.069 0.254 
ISCED_5 0.220 0.414 
ISCED_6 0.010 0.099 
SUBORDINATES 0.169 0.375 
ASSESSMENT 0.399 0.490 
GENDER 0.558 0.497 
NOISE 1.255 0.948 
OTHER_JOBS 0.066 0.248 
ISCO_1 0.062 0.240 
ISCO_2 0.087 0.283 
ISCO_3 0.140 0.347 
ISCO_4 0.136 0.343 
ISCO_5 0.165 0.371 
ISCO_6 0.009 0.094 
ISCO_7 0.176 0.381 
ISCO_8 0.118 0.323 
ISCO_9 0.106 0.308 
NACE_1 0.025 0.157 
NACE_2 0.271 0.444 
NACE_3 0.014 0.118 
NACE_4 0.097 0.296 
NACE_5 0.227 0.419 
NACE_6 0.063 0.242 
NACE_7 0.071 0.257 
NACE_8 0.050 0.219 
NACE_9 0.102 0.302 
NACE_10 0.009 0.093 
NACE_11 0.072 0.258 
UNIT_SIZE_1 0.022 0.148 
UNIT_SIZE_2_4 0.145 0.353 
UNIT_SIZE_5_9 0.180 0.384 
UNIT_SIZE_10_49 0.325 0.468 
UNIT_SIZE_50_99 0.105 0.306 
UNIT_SIZE_100_249 0.098 0.298 
UNIT_SIZE_250_499 0.049 0.217 
UNIT_SIZE_500+ 0.075 0.263 
YEAR2010 0.617 0.486 
.
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Table 2.2: Correlation matrix. Variables are defined as described in Table 2.7. Entire sample (N=22,788) is applied here. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_ 
TRAINING 
1               
2 EMPLOYEE_PAID_ 
TRAINING 
0.096*** 1              
3 ON_THE_JOB_TRAINING 0.410*** 0.065*** 1             
4 PROM_INCENTIVES 0.225*** 0.058*** 0.181*** 1            
5 INDV_PAY -0.005 0.015** 0.032*** 0.018*** 1           
6 PROFIT_SHARE 0.178*** 0.019*** 0.132*** 0.153*** 0.098*** 1          
7 EQUITY_COMP 0.092*** 0.026*** 0.062*** 0.092*** 0.050*** 0.283*** 1         
8 JOB_LOSS_PROB -0.101*** 0.008 -0.046*** -0.163*** 0.047*** -0.080*** -0.062*** 1        
9 GENDER 0.034*** -0.010 0.021*** 0.081*** 0.071*** 0.076*** 0.052*** -0.003 1       
10 TENURE 0.042*** -0.032*** -0.004 -0.054*** -0.016** 0.059*** 0.082*** -0.121*** 0.086*** 1      
11 AGE -0.011* -0.047*** -0.056*** -0.169*** -0.030*** 0.018*** 0.038*** -0.034*** 0.013** 0.522*** 1     
12 AGE*AGE -0.020*** -0.048*** -0.058*** -0.169*** -0.032*** 0.009 0.034*** -0.034*** 0.018*** 0.516*** 0.988*** 1    
13 SUBORDINATES 0.151*** 0.068*** 0.075*** 0.195*** -0.009 0.135*** 0.099*** -0.082*** 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.069*** 0.057*** 1   
14 ISCO_1 0.109*** 0.035*** 0.059*** 0.146*** -0.014** 0.145*** 0.112*** -0.058*** 0.053*** 0.042*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.370*** 1  
15 NOISE 0.167*** 0.041*** 0.126*** 0.096*** -0.043*** 0.104*** 0.065*** -0.047*** -0.021*** 0.038*** -0.038*** -0.044*** 0.170*** 0.127*** 1 
16 OTHER_JOBS 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.031*** -0.011 0.018*** 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.016** -0.040*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 0.021*** -0.010 0.033*** 
17 COMPLEX_TASKS 0.177*** 0.055*** 0.158*** 0.187*** 0.027*** 0.119*** 0.066*** -0.040*** 0.119*** 0.075*** 0.019*** 0.009 0.160*** 0.111*** 0.222*** 
18 OWN_IDEAS 0.156*** 0.057*** 0.076*** 0.279*** -0.019*** 0.110*** 0.064*** -0.171*** 0.076*** 0.066*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.216*** 0.145*** 0.157*** 
19 ROTATING_TASKS 0.083*** 0.010 0.115*** 0.021*** 0.009 0.033*** 0.018*** 0.010 0.024*** -0.008 -0.064*** -0.067*** 0.038*** -0.017** 0.139*** 
20 ASSESSMENT 0.237*** 0.050*** 0.236*** 0.176*** 0.050*** 0.157*** 0.098*** -0.036*** 0.027*** 0.007 -0.033*** -0.035*** 0.123*** 0.097*** 0.124*** 









Table 2.2 cont’d 
 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_ 
TRAINING 
      
2 EMPLOYEE_PAID_ 
TRAINING 
      
 3 ON_THE_JOB_TRAINING       
4 PROM_INCENTIVES       
5 INDV_PAY       
6 PROFIT_SHARE       
7 EQUITY_COMP       
8 JOB_LOSS_PROB       
9 GENDER       
10 TENURE       
11 AGE       
12 AGE*AGE       
13 SUBORDINATES       
14 ISCO_1       
15 NOISE       
16 OTHER_JOBS 1      
17 COMPLEX_TASKS 0.003 1     
18 OWN_IDEAS 0.018*** 0.199*** 1    
19 ROTATING_TASKS 0.022*** 0.090*** 0.031*** 1   
20 ASSESSMENT 0.006 0.151*** 0.110*** 0.088*** 1  
21 QUALITY_STANDARDS -0.000 0.182*** 0.047*** 0.100*** 0.116*** 1 
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2.3.4 Specification of models 
2.3.4.1 Firm-specific human capital acquisition 
To test H1, I regress EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING on PROM_INCENTIVES 







I calculate clustered robust standard errors by choosing year, country and industry 
dummy variables as cluster variables.17 Besides, I calculate McFadden’s likelihood ratio 
index (LRI) (McFadden, 1974) to measure goodness of fit. 
If PROM_INCENTIVES possesses a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
H1 is confirmed. 
2.3.4.2 General human capital acquisition 
To test H2, I regress EMPLOYEE_PAID_TRAINING on INDV_PPAY in the 







Again, I calculate clustered robust standard errors by choosing year, country and 
industry dummy variables as cluster variables and McFadden’s likelihood ratio index 
(LRI) (McFadden, 1974) to measure goodness of fit. 
If PERFORMANCE_PAY exhibits a positive and statistically significant coefficient, 
H2 is supported. 
I estimate M1 and M2 with a sample of employees who have been working with the 
firm for at least one year to rule out that the training took place while they were not in 
the current firm and provided with the incentives of interest, PROM_INCENTIVES and 
INDV_PPAY or, even, unemployed.18 Otherwise, my analysis could suffer from 
endogeneity problems because if the training took place before joining the current firm, 
there could be a reverse causality of training on incentive design. 
                                                 
17 See Petersen (2009) for the necessity of clustered robust standard errors.  
18 I also provide estimations with the entire sample in the robustness analyses Section. 
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2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 Firm-specific human capital acquisition 
My results from M1 are illustrated in Table 2.3. Since the coefficient on 
PROM_INCENTIVES is positive and significant at the one percent level, H1 is 
confirmed reflecting a positive relation of promotion incentives with nonverifiable firm-
specific human capital acquisition. 
The coefficient on INDV_PPAY is statistically insignificant. Hence, there is no relation 
of individual performance pay with nonverifiable firm-specific human capital. Even 
though Prendergast (1993) does not model performance pay explicitly,19 his assumption 
indicates that individual performance pay cannot induce employees to train. To support 
this argument, I refer to the ratchet effect literature (e.g. Weitzman, 1980; Freixas et al., 
1985) that also assumes that the firm will behave opportunistically and renege on future 
individual performance pay contracts once it has learnt about task productivity. As a 
result, the employee is reluctant to exert maximum effort that I also assign to training 
effort. This finding contradicts Siemsen et al. (2005) and Hashimoto (1979) who show 
theoretically positive relations of individual performance pay with on-the-job learning. 
The reason for it is that they do not address nonverifiability of such learning and 
accompanying commitment problems. 
It is noteworthy that PROFIT_SHARE exhibits a positive and statistically significant at 
the one percent level coefficient. As group-based performance pay, it is likely related to 
cooperative tasks (Wageman, 1995; Wageman and Baker, 1997; Siemsen et al., 2007; 
Hwang et al., 2009; Drago and Turnbull, 1988). In this case, performance measurement 
is very noisy (Holmström, 1982) and due to this less likely supports opportunistic 
behavior by the firm. Besides, manipulating performance measurement to understate 
employee performance is less possible, because I expect that firm performance 
measurement is scrutinized by many stakeholders and shareholders. Further, if the firm 
profits from opportunistic behavior, the employee also benefits from it through the 
higher firm performance caused by its opportunism. On the contrary, EQUITY_COMP 
has no statistically significant relation to the training. 
                                                 
19 In fact, he assumes that the wage cannot be conditioned on human capital or output because both are 
nonverifiable. 
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Table 2.3: Main models about human capital acquisition. Variables are defined as 
described in Table 2.7. Standard errors are clustered robust with year, country and 
industry variables as cluster variables and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level.  
 M1 (PROBIT) M2 (PROBIT) 


















































































































N 22,788 22,788 
McFadden-LRI 0.1822 0.1055 
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To support my interpretation that EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING reflects firm-
specific human capital acquisition and training that leads to higher productivity on the 
next job than on the current job, I analyze some control variables in the following. 
The positive coefficient (significant at the one percent level) on COMPLEX_TASKS 
that Ortega (2009) interpret as proxy variable for specific knowledge indicates that the 
training refers to firm-specific rather than general human capital acquisition. 
Since OWN_IDEAS reflects the high value of employee’s existent human capital, its 
positive and significant at the one percent level coefficient indicates that the training has 
likely a high intellectual level because only then it is able to add value to employee’s 
already very valuable human capital. Since I argue that very intellectual skills are more 
valuable for managerial jobs, it is likely that human capital acquired by such training 
makes the employee more productive on the next job with a higher rank rather than on 
the current job with a lower rank.  
The same argument is supported by findings about SUBORDINATES and ISCO_1: 
Both SUBORDINATES and ISCO_1 (managers) exhibit positive coefficients 
(significant at y < 0.01). In addition, the highest marginal effect on an occupation 
control variable is on ISCO_1 (not reported). Since managers are likely to learn 
managerial skills that I assume to be more valuable the higher they climb up the career 
ladder, it also supports the interpretation of the training as preparation for higher-rank 
jobs. 
For ISCED_4, ISCED_5, and ISCED_6, I estimate positive marginal effects (significant 
at p < 0.01, 0.01 and 0.05, respectively, not reported) which rise with the level of 
education showing that training is undertaken by well-educated employees who have 
less acquisition costs compared to lower-educated employees. The fact that the marginal 
effects rise with the level of education also indicates that the training is related to a high 
intellectual level.  
OTHER_JOBS exhibits a positive coefficient (significant at p < 0.01). This finding can 
reflect that there is an outside option for the employee so that the firm is less likely able 
to behave opportunistically on firm-specific human capital acquisition. Moreover, it can 
indicate that the firm provides the training to retain him. In this manner, I interpret it as 
an additional proxy variable for promotion incentives.  
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Since there are more career opportunities in bigger firms and the marginal effects (not 
reported) on the unit size (UNIT_SIZE_X) turn positive and rise with the size, I 
consider it an additional indication for a training that prepares employees to make career 
advancement. 
ROTATING_TASKS can only provide mixed indication for my interpretation because 
task rotation as type of job rotation is regarded as mechanism to learn skills for career 
advancement (Saari et al., 1988) but also as remedy against the ratchet effect (Ickes and 
Samuelson, 1987) that is related to the firm’s inability to commit to future 
compensation. 
2.4.2 General human capital acquisition 
In M2, INDV_PPAY exhibit a positive and statistically significant at the five percent 
level coefficient. This finding supports H2 indicating that individual performance pay is 
positively related to general human capital acquisition. 
It is noteworthy that PROM_INCENTIVES exhibits a statistically insignificant 
coefficient. I suggest that promotion incentives could induce general human capital 
acquisition. However, if they are not provided, an employee can also be induced to train 
to get equipped with skills enabling him to leave the firm. 
The fact that QUALITY_STANDARDS has no statistically significant relation to the 
employee-paid training indicates that such training is related to general human capital 
acquisition because quality standards are likely very firm-specific. The positive 
coefficient (significant at p < 0.01) on OTHER_JOBS also supports this interpretation.  
Since equity compensation is seen as retention instrument (Oyer and Schaefer, 2005), I 
interpret it as a signal for the existence of employee’s outside options. If the employee 
has outside options, he is more likely to acquire general human capital. The positive 
coefficient on EQUITY_COMP (significant at p < 0.05) supports this argument. 
The positive coefficient on ISCO_1 (significant at p <0.01) also supports this 
interpretation because I expect managers to leave the firm more likely because job 
opportunities are getting less the higher the rank (Gibbs, 2005). 
The positive coefficient on COMPLEX_TASKS (significant at p < 0.01) indicates that 
the general human capital acquired in the employee-paid training can also be utilized on 
the current job. 
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2.5 Robustness analyses 
2.5.1 Alternative model specifications 
I also estimate M1 and M2 with squared versions of PROM_INCENTIVES, 
PROM_INCENTIVES*PROM_INCENTIVES and the logarithm of 
(PROM_INCENTIVES+1). Then, I yield the same qualitative results.20 
If I do not restrict my sample to employees who have been working with the firm for at 
least one year and also include recently hired employees (not reported), I obtain the 
same qualitative results regarding the hypotheses. 
2.5.2 Alternative proxy for firm-specific human capital 
An alternative proxy variable for firm-specific human capital is on-the-job training, 
ON_THE_JOB_TRAINING, that is based on the question if the employee has 
undergone on-the-job training over the 12 months preceding the date of the interview. 
31.5 percent of all employees have undertaken such training. I assume that 
ON_THE_JOB_TRAINING reflects very likely job-specific human capital acquisition 
that is part of firm-specific human capital acquisition: The engineer, for instance, gets 
on-the-job-training about a new machine configuration by his colleagues. However, if 
he is promoted to the production division manager, he does not necessarily utilize the 
knowledge about the machine configuration any more. The following analysis addresses 
this argument. 
If I apply M1 with ON_THE_JOB_TRAINING as dependent variable denoted as 
M3(1), I observe a positive and statistically at the one percent level coefficient on 
PROM_INCENTIVES (depicted in Table 2.4).  
This result, however, suffers from a misspecification error because if I include its 
squared version, PROM_INCENITVES*PROM_INCENTIVES, in the model, i.e., 
M3(2), its coefficient is negative.  
                                                 
20 The coefficient on the logarithm of PROM_INCENTIVES is positive and statistically significant at p < 
0.01 while the coefficient on PROM_INCENTIVES*PROM_INCENTIVES is statistically insignificant. 
According to Ai and Norton (2003), interaction terms with continuously scaled variables such as 
PROM_INCENTIVES in probit regression models suffer from wrong calculations of their coefficients 
and standard errors by statistics software. Due to this problem, I also estimate M1 and M2 as linear 
probability models (tot reported). In M1, the coefficient PROM_INCENTIVES*PROM_INCENTIVES is 
statistically significant at p < 0.01 whereas PROM_INCENTIVES itself not. Nevertheless, this finding 




According to Ai and Norton (2003), interaction terms with continuously scaled 
variables such as PROM_INCENTIVES*PROM_INCENTIVES in probit regression 
models are not properly calculated by standard statistics software, I estimate the model 
as a linear probability model.21 Then, the coefficient on PROM_INCENTIVES is 
positive and significant at the one percent level supporting H1.  
It is noteworthy that now the coefficient on INDV_PPAY is positive and statistically 
significant at p < 0.05. This finding supports Siemsen et al. (2005), Hashimoto (1979) 
and Kwon (2006) indicating that on-the-job training is less exposed to the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by the firm. 
Moreover, one can argue that employer-provided training is the same as on-the-job 
training so that the interpretation is not right that it measures human capital that is likely 
more productive on the next job. The employee does not characterize both trainings as 
the same because the two-way Table 2.5 shows that a lot of employees mention on-the-














                                                 




Table 2.4: Robustness analyses. Variables are defined as described in Table 2.7. 
Standard errors are clustered robust with year, country and industry variables as 
cluster variables and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance 
at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level.  
 M3(1) (PROBIT) M3(2) (PROBIT) M3(3) (LPM) M4 (LPM) 





































































































































































N 22,788 22,788 22,788 5,677 
McFadden-LRI (PROBIT)/R2 (LPM) 0.1367 0.1369 0.1604 0.1263 
 
Table 2.5: Employer-provided trainings and on-the-job-trainings. Variables are defined 
as described in Table 2.7. 
 ON_THE_JOB_TRAINING TOTAL 
EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING 0 1  
0 13,079 3,140 16,219 
1 2,537 4,032 6,569 
TOTAL 15,616 7,172 22,788 
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Now, I consider the situation that an employee is supposed to choose one of two 
available trainings that are represented by EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING and 
ON_THE_JOB_TRAINING. Consistent with Prendergast (1993), I expect that the 
employee will choose employer-provided trainings rather than on-the-job trainings if 
promotion incentives are provided. The reason for it is that I expect that employer-
provided trainings increase more likely human capital that is more productive on the 
next job than on-the-job trainings. 
To show this, I estimate a linear probability model (LPM) of M1 with a reduced sample 
containing 5,677 employees who have exclusively undergone one of the two types of 
trainings (depicted in Table 2.5) that I denote as M4.22 Then, I obtain the following 
combined effect of PROM_INCENTIVES and 
PROM_INCENTIVES*PROM_INCENTIVES as shown in Figure 2.1: I observe that 
for high values of PROM_INCENTIVES the likelihood to prefer an employer-provided 
training relative to an on-the-job training is higher. This finding also supports H1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Relation of PROM_INCENTIVES and 
EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING relative to ON_THE_JOB_TRAINING. 
 
                                                 
22 This approach is also used by Hwang et al. (2008) to show the relative importance of group-based pay 
over individual-based pay in conjunction with knowledge sharing. 
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2.5.4 Endogeneity concerns 
2.5.4.1 Discussion 
Problems of endogeneity can occur if an explanatory variable of interest is correlated 
with the disturbances (i.e., error term) of the model. Examples are an omitted variable 
bias caused by a reverse causality with the dependent variable (Green, 2013). 
Since it refers to a time span from the time of the interview that does not exceed 12 
months and the provision of the incentives is measured at the time of the interview, it is 
possible that the provision of incentives in place at the time of the interview are the 
reward of such training if the training was completed before the interview (i.e., reverse 
causality). As a result, PROM_INCENTIVES and INDV_PPAY can be endogenous.  
I, however, regard this interpretation of the question as unlikely because of the 
following two reasons. 23 First, the firm and the employee need time to negotiate on a 
new incentive design so that it is unlikely that at the time of the interview the incentive 
design is different from the one before the training. Second, 
EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING and EMPLOYEE_PAID_TRAINING do not 
rule out that the training is still ongoing at the time of the interview making a recent 
change in incentive design also unlikely.  
2.5.4.2 Control for job loss probability 
Another problem of endogeneity can arise from the following omitted variable bias: If 
the employee’s likelihood of getting dismissed (omitted variable) is high and leads to a 
weaker perception of a promotion incentives (negative correlation), this omitted 
variable might be correlated positively with EMPLOYEE_PAID_TRAINING to find a 
new job or negatively related to EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING. To rule out 
such omitted variable bias, I include in M1 and M2 a variable, JOB_LOSS_PROB, 
whose values range from ‘0’ (‘strongly disagree’) to ‘4’ (‘strongly agree’) answering the 
question if he might lose his job in the next six months. The results remain qualitatively 
the same (depicted in Table 2.6).  
It is noteworthy that the coefficient on JOB_LOSS_PROB is negative for 
EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING and positive for 
                                                 
23 Kruse et al. (2008), for instance, apply a similar approach when they also regress training in the 
previous 12 months on the provision of group-based incentives as a profit sharing plan and then regard 
this as evidence that such incentives motivate training. 
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EMPLOYEE_PAID_TRAINING supporting my interpretation that the former is related 
to firm-specific human capital acquisition and the latter to general human capital 
acquisition. 
2.5.4.2 Control for outside options 
PROM_INCENTIVES and INDV_PPAY could be endogenous if they are correlated to 
an omitted variable that represents outside options. So, the positive correlation of 
PROM_INCENTIVES with EMPLOYER_PROVIDED_TRAINING can, for instance, 
be caused by such omitted variable and not by the incentives themselves. Due to this, I 
include in M1 and M2 a variable, OUTSIDE_OPTION, whose values range from ‘1’ 
(‘strongly disagree’) to ‘5’ (‘strongly agree’) answering the question whether the 
employee would get a new job with a similar salary if he lost his current job.  
Since this variable is only available for the EWSC 2010 sample, I do not include it in 
my main analysis. Again, I obtain the same qualitative results (depicted in Table 2.6).  
Interestingly, in both models its coefficient is positive. In M1, the finding indicates that 
the outside option disciplines the firm not to behave opportunistically against him 
because then he can threaten credibly to leave the firm. Concerning M2, I argue that 
outside options induce the employee to acquire general human capital that he can also 














Table 2.6: Robustness analyses. Variables are defined as described in Table 2.7. 
Standard errors are clustered robust with year, country and industry variables as 
cluster variables and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance 
at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level.  
 M5 (PROBIT) M6 (PROBIT) M7 (PROBIT) M8 (PROBIT) 








































































































































































N 22,788 22,788 13,606 13,606 






I provide empirical evidence about how promotion incentives and performance pay are 
related to nonverifiable human capital acquisition contingent on its grade of firm 
specificity.  
Consistent with Prendergast (1993), if nonverifiable human capital is firm-specific and 
leads to higher employee’s productivity on the next job, I document a positive relation 
of promotion incentives with such human capital acquisition whereas I find no relation 
of individual performance pay with such acquisition. On the contrary, if human capital 
is general, I document a positive relation of individual performance pay to its 
acquisition.  
My findings are robust against some model specification concerns and against sample 
selection bias concerns. In addition, I rebut some endogeneity concerns.  
Suggestions for future research 
Concerning my methodology, it would be advantageous for further research to track 
employees in a panel dataset to yield more insight into their human capital acquisition 
dynamics over time and control for employee- and firm-fixed effects. 
To conclude, the firm can steer precisely which type of human capital the employee 
chooses to acquire. Promotion incentives are positively related to firm-specific human 
capital acquisition whereas individual performance pay to job-specific and general 
human capital.  
In addition, since in my sample employer-provided trainings representing firm-specific 
human capital acquisition are more prevalent than employee-paid trainings reflecting 
general human capital acquisition (i.e., 28.8 percent vs. 4.6 percent), employees are 
more concerned if and how they profit from firm-specific rather than general human 
capital acquisition. This finding leads to a possible answer to the question asked by 
Baker et al. (1988) and Prendergast (1999) why promotion incentives are prevalent: 
Firms prefer providing promotion incentives rather than performance pay to address 





Table 2.7: Definitions of variables. 
Variable Question in EWCS 2005 (EWSC 
2010) 
Definition 
Incentive proxy variables of interest 
INDV_PPAY ef6b. What does your remuneration 
include: Piece rate or productivity 
payments? (ef7b. Thinking about 
your earnings from your main job, 
what do they include – Piece rate or 
productivity payments?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ 
if compensation includes an 
individual bonus (e.g., piece rate 
or productivity payments) and to 
‘0’ otherwise 
PROM_INCENTIVES q37c. My job offers good prospects 
for career advancement (q77c. How 
much do you agree or disagree with 
statements describing some aspects of 
your job – My job offers good 
prospects for career advancement?) 
Numeric variable that ranges 
from ‘0’ (‘strongly disagree’) to 
‘4’ (‘strongly agree’) 
Human capital acquisition proxy variables 
EMPLOYEE_PAID_ 
TRAINING 
q28b_1. Have you undergone: 
Training paid for by yourself? (q61b. 
Over the past 12 months, have you 
undergone any of types of training to 
improve your skills or not - Training 
paid for by yourself?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ 
if such employee-paid training 




q28a_1. Have you undergone: 
Training paid for or provided by your 
employer, or by yourself if you are 
self-employed? (q61a. Over the past 
12 months, have you undergone any 
of types of training to improve your 
skills or not - Training paid for or 
provided by your employer or by 
yourself if self-employed?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ 
if employer-provided training has 
been undergone and to ‘0’ 
otherwise 
ON_THE_JOB_TRAINING q28c. Have you undergone: On-the- Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ 
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job training? (q61c. Over the past 12 
months, have you undergone any of 
types of training to improve your 
skills or not - On-the-job training?) 
if on-the-job training has been 
undergone and to ‘0’ otherwise. 
Control variables 
AGE hh2b. Age-Respondent (hh2b. Age – 
Respondent) 
Numeric, continuous variable for 
years of age 
ASSESSMENT q30c. Over the past 12 months have 
you been subject to regular formal 
assessment of your work 
performance? (q62a. Over the past 12 
months, have you – Been subject to 
formal assessment of your work 
performance?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ 
if respondent has been subject to 
a formal work assessment and to 
‘0’ otherwise 
COMPLEX_TASKS q23e. Does your main paid job 
involve: complex tasks? (q49e. 
Generally, does your main paid job 
involve complex tasks?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ 
if respondent’s job involves 




Country where interview was 
conducted 
Dummy variables for 35 
European countries  
EQUITY_COMP ef6i. What does your remuneration 
include: Income from shares in the 
company your work for? (ef7i. 
Thinking about your earnings from 
your main job, what do they include – 
Income from shares in the company 
your work for?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ 
if compensation includes stock of 
the firm and to ‘0’ otherwise 
GENDER hh2a. Sex – Respondent (hh2a. Sex – 
Respondent) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ 




ISCED classification: the highest 
level of education or training  
4 dummy variables indicating 
level (X) of education with value 
of ‘1’ and ‘0’ otherwise:  
(X = 0_2) Less than upper 
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secondary education (not 
included) 
(X = 3) Upper secondary 
education 
(X = 4) Post-secondary including 
pre-vocational education   
(X = 5) Tertiary education – first 
level  
(X = 6) Tertiary education – 
advanced level  
Industry variables 
(NACE_X) 
NACE industry classification Dummy variables for 11 included 
industries with X representing 
respective codes according to 
NACE nomenclature 
JOB_LOSS_PROB q37a. I might lose my job in the next 
6 months. (q77a. How much do you 
agree or disagree with statements 
describing some aspects of your job - 
I might lose my job in the next 6 
months?) 
Numeric variable that ranges 
from ‘0’ (‘strongly disagree’) to 
‘4’ (‘strongly agree’) 
NOISE q22a. How often do you have to 
interrupt a task you are doing in order 
to take on an unforeseen task? (q47. 
How often do you have to interrupt a 
task you are doing in order to take on 
an unforeseen task?) 
Numeric variable that ranges 




International Standard Classification 
of Occupations (ISCO) 
8 dummy variables for different 
occupations with X representing 
respective codes according to 
ISCO nomenclature: 





(X=3) Technicians and associate  
Professionals 
(X=4) Clerks 
(X=5) Service workers and shop 
 and market sales workers 
(X=6) Skilled agricultural and 
fishery  
Workers 
(X=7) Craft and related trades  
workers 
(X=8) Plant and machine 
operators and assemblers 
(X=9)Elementary occupations 
(not included) 
OTHER_JOBS q9a. Besides your main paid job, do 
you have any other paid job(s)? (q21. 
Besides your main paid job, do you 
have any other paid job(s)?) 
Dummy variable that has a value 
of ‘1’ for employees with more 
than one job and ‘0’ otherwise 
OUTSIDE_OPTION Only available in EWSC2010 (q77f. 
How much do you agree or disagree 
with statements describing some 
aspects of your job - If I were to lose 
or quit my current job, it would be 
easy for me to find a job of similar 
salary?) 
Numeric variable that ranges 
from ‘1’(‘strongly disagree) to 
‘5’ (‘strongly agree’) 
OWN_IDEAS q25j. Are you able to apply your own 
ideas in your work? (q51i. Select the 
response which best describes your 
work situation – You are able to 
apply your own ideas in your work) 
Numeric variable that ranges 
from ‘1’(almost never) to ‘5’ 
(almost always) 
PROFIT_SHARE ef6g. What does your remuneration 
include: Payments based on the 
overall performance of the company 
where you work? (ef7g. Thinking 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ 
if compensation includes 
payments based on company 
performance and to ‘0’ otherwise 
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about your earnings from your main 
job, what do they include – Payments 
based on the overall performance of 
the company where you work?) 
ROTATING_TASKS q26a. Does your job involve rotating 
tasks between yourself and 
colleagues? (q53. Does your job 
involve rotating tasks between 
yourself and colleagues?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ 
if respondent faces task rotation 
with colleagues and to ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
QUALITY_STANDARDS q23_a. Does your main job involve 
meeting precise quality standards 
(q49a. Generally, does your main 
paid job involve meeting precise 
quality standards?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ 
if employee has to meet precise 
quality standards and ‘0’ 
otherwise 
SUBORDINATES q7. How many people work under 
your supervision? (q17. How many 
people work under your supervision, 
for whom pay increases, bonuses or 
promotion depend directly on you?) 
Dummy variable set to ‘1’ if 
employee have at least one 
subordinate and to ‘0’ otherwise 
TENURE q2d. How many years have you been 
in your company or organisation? 
(q12. How many years have you been 
in your company or organisation?) 
Numeric, continuous variable for 
years of employment in current 
firm 
UNIT_SIZE_X  q6. How many people in total work in 
the local unit of the establishment 
where you work? (q11. How many 
people in total work at your 
workplace?) 
8 dummy variables with the size 
X: 
(X = 1) 1 (not included) 
(X = 2_4) 2-4 
(X = 5_9) 5-9 
(X = 10_49) 10-49 
(X = 50_99) 50-99 
(X = 100_249) 100-249 
(X = 250_499) 250-499 
(X = 500+) 500 or more 
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YEAR2010  Dummy variable is set to ‘1’ if 
interview took place in 2010 and 





Job Rotation and Employer Learning About Human 
Capital 
3.1. Introduction 
Job rotation denotes employees’ lateral transfers between jobs within the same firm 
(Campion et al., 1994). An example of job rotation is a car production employee who 
regularly changes his position along the assembly line, e.g., from installing engines to 
installing cockpits. Job rotation in such manufacturing firms is prevalent: 
Osterman (1994), for instance, documents that 55.6 percent of manufacturing 
establishments in his U.S. sample adopt job rotation while 43.4 percent of all firms 
including both service and manufacturing firms implement job rotation.24 
Since in academia the term job rotation ‘has one of the longer legacies among work 
practice innovations’ (Cappelli and Neumark, 2001, p. 767), different arguments exist to 
explain why job rotation is adopted. One argument is that job rotation enables employer 
learning.25 
My study is the first that tests directly Ortega’s (2001) employer learning argument. 
Consistent with his theoretical model findings, I document that job rotation is adopted if 
the firm is uncertain about employees’ job-specific human capital (e.g., employees’ job-
specific ability) or job-specific nonhuman capital (e.g., the applied technology) or if 
employees’ job performance is influenced by an exogenous shock.  
These three components can be illustrated in the above production example as follows: 
If the worker has problems to install an engine, it is not evident if he is not able to 
follow the instructions (low value of his job-specific human capital), if the applied 
technology to assist the employee to install it is not productive (low value of job-
specific nonhuman capital) or if the engine was not assembled properly (exogenous 
shock).  
                                                 
24 See for more about the prevalence of job rotation Osterman, 2000; Pil and MacDuffie, 1996; Gittleman 
et al., 1998; Eriksson and Ortega, 2006. 
25 Throughout this Chapter, I use the term ‘firm’ as synonym for an employer or a principal whereas an 
employee is an agent. 
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If another employee is assigned to the job according to a job rotation policy, the firm is 
able to identify the cause of the problem more accurately: Job rotation, for instance, 
eliminates the influence of job-specific nonhuman capital on employees’ performance 
measurement because as a common component of production for both employees it is 
factored out if the firm compares employees’ job performances. 
For my analysis, I choose a comprehensive employee-based sample containing 26,957 
observations from 35 European countries provided by the Fourth and Fifth European 
Working Conditions Survey in 2005 and 2010, respectively. The observations include 
all possible occupations, ranks, and industries. 
Since the sample is employee-based, my study has the advantage relative to other 
studies such as Eriksson and Ortega (2006) that it allows to observing uncertainty about 
job-specific human capital and nonhuman capital and an exogenous shock at different 
employee-job matches and thus can control more precisely for employee and job 
heterogeneity.  
In contrast to other studies about job rotation, my results are more representative 
because those studies are restricted either to one country (e.g., Osterman, 1994, 2000; 
Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Eriksson and Ortega, 2006) or to one firm (e.g., Campion 
et al., 1994; Kusunoki and Numagami, 1998). 
I assume adoption of job rotation if the employee rotates tasks because I interpret a task 
as a job and task rotation denotes employees’ lateral transfers to different tasks within 
the same firm. To identify Ortega’s (2001) three types of uncertainty, I proceed as 
follows: First, if a job includes complex tasks, I regard such a situation as one in which 
the firm is uncertain about job-specific nonhuman capital. Second, if the employee is 
able to apply his own ideas in his job, I assume that the firm is uncertain about job-
specific human capital. Third, I measure the likelihood of an exogenous shock (i.e., 
noise in performance measurement) as the frequency of unforeseeable interruptions of 
the employee’s tasks.  
In addition to the employer learning argument of job rotation, literature provides two 
alternative arguments, the so-called employee motivation and the employee learning 
argument. The employee motivation argument addresses psychological motivation 
through mitigating boredom on monotonous jobs (e.g., Walker and Guest, 1952): The 
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employee’s change of job could make his work more interesting and consequently could 
motivate him. 
The employee learning argument addresses that job rotation helps the employee to learn 
new things (Eriksson and Ortega, 2006): The employee, for instance, has to learn more 
about the car, in particular its different parts and how they depend on each other (e.g., 
Aoki, 1986). Then, he can use this knowledge to optimize the handover process along 
the assembly line. Another objective of employee learning is to obtain all skills that are 
necessary for career advancement (Saari et al., 1988): The car production employee 
learns all steps of the production process to become eligible for a supervisor position.  
My findings do not support these alternatives. Moreover, they are consistent with 
complementary theories advancing the employer learning argument. 
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2, I provide a literature 
review about all arguments of job rotation and infer my hypotheses from Ortega’s 
(2001) model. Section 3 contains a sample description and model specifications. Section 
4 presents empirical results and discusses their consistency with alternative arguments 
of job rotation. Section 5 provides robustness analyses and Section 6 concludes. 
50 
 
3.2 Literature review and hypotheses 
3.2.1 Literature review 
My analysis is designed to shed light on the employer learning argument of job rotation. 
In the following, I review the literature about this argument and its alternatives, the 
employee motivation and employee learning argument. 
3.2.1.1 Employer learning 
Concerning the employer learning argument, the theoretical literature usually 
differentiates between two dimensions. The first dimension denotes the learning object, 
i.e., if the firm learns about employee productivity (e.g., Ortega, 2001; Meyer, 1994; 
Arya and Mittendorf, 2006a, 2006b) or about task productivity (e.g., Arya and 
Mittendorf, 2004; Ickes and Samuelson, 1987). The second dimension refers to two 
underlying information distributions between the firm and the employee. First, the firm 
and the employee are a priori symmetrically uncertain about the learning object. 
Second, the employee is better informed than the firm about the learning object. In the 
latter case, moral hazard problems such as concealing information about task 
productivity through exertion of lower effort, i.e., the so-called ratchet effect (Ickes and 
Samuelson, 1987), are arising. 
Inspired by the job matching literature such as Jovanovich (1979) and Miller (1984), 
Ortega (2001) addresses the firm’s problem of matching employees with jobs if an 
employee’s job-specific human capital (employee productivity) or job-specific 
nonhuman capital (task productivity) are a priori symmetrically unknown to both the 
firm and the employee. He finds that a job rotation policy is economically superior over 
a specialization policy (i.e., employee stays on the same job for several periods of time) 
regardless of any level of uncertainty about both types of capital and an exogenous 
shock. Further, he shows that the firm learns about the value of employees’ job-specific 
human capital by comparing different employees on the same job. Since I base my 
hypotheses on his model, I present it in greater detail when I formulate my hypotheses. 
Meyer (1994) also analyzes how job assignments can reveal information about 
employees’ abilities. The main difference to Ortega (2001) is that in her model seniors’ 
abilities are learnt when their subordinates rotate (i.e., switch seniors). Then, job 
rotation is not about revelation of the rotating employee’s abilities. 
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While Ortega (2001) addresses employer learning by the comparison of employees, 
alternative theoretical models in the literature address moral hazard problems arising 
from information asymmetries between employees and their firms about either 
employee productivity (Arya and Mittendorf, 2006a) or task productivity (Ickes and 
Samuelson, 1987; Arya and Mittendorf, 2004; Eguchi, 2005) 
If the employee is better informed than the firm about task productivity and he exerts 
maximum effort, the firm is able to learn about task productivity. Since the firm cannot 
credibly commit to future compensation schemes, the employee fears that the firm will 
demand higher levels of performance at the same compensation level once it learns 
about true task productivity. As a result, the employee is reluctant to exert maximum 
effort to keep the firm from learning. This is the so-called ratchet effect (e.g. Weitzman, 
1980, Freixas et al., 1985). Ickes and Samuelson (1987) prove in their theoretical model 
that job rotation is more beneficial for the firm than specialization if the firm is less 
informed about task productivity than the employee is.  
With regard to the car production example, the employee can be better informed about 
the productivity of the new robotic arm the employee uses to install engines. If he 
rotates jobs, he will exert maximum effort because in the next period he will be 
assigned to another job. The reason is that the firm’s adjustment of performance pay for 
the former job due to its learning about task productivity does not affect his future 
compensation on the next job.26 
Similarly, Arya and Mittendorf (2004) assume in the case of job rotation that the 
employee reveals explicitly his former task productivity through reports in the second 
period. The firm can apply the reports for improving the next employee’s assessment on 
this job.27 
Unlike Ickes and Samuelson (1987), Hakenes and Katolnik (2014) show that 
elimination of information about past performance after job rotation creates incentives 
                                                 
26 Concerning the ratchet effect and job rotation, Choi and Thum (2003) analyze the dynamics of 
corruption. Unlike Ickes and Samuelson (1987), they let the principals (i.e., the corrupt officials) rotate 
rather than the agents. To support this kind of rotation, they refer to the guidelines for the prevention of 
corruption by the German Federal Ministry of the Interior in 1998 that make job rotation obligatory for 
positions which are potentially prone to corruption. Interestingly, they find that job rotation of the 
principal is not always beneficial. 
27 Similarly, Carmichael and MacLeod (1993) analyze theoretically that multi-skilled employees are more 
willing to reveal information about labor-cost saving technical change. They state that job rotation leads 
to collection of those skills (employee learning). This is contrary to Arya and Mittendorf (2004) who do 
not consider issues of employee’s eligibility for the next job: They assume that job rotation is possible 
regardless of employee’s skills. 
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for the employee to exert effort because by doing so the employee wants to reveal 
information about his ability due to career concerns. 
Eguchi (2005) shows that job rotation alleviates influence activities if performance 
measurement is noisy. Influence activities are employee’s activities that, for instance, 
distract him from conducting his job or influence performance measurement by 
colluding with his supervisor (e.g., Milgrom, 1988; Tirole, 1986). Since Eguchi (2005) 
assumes that the value of influence activities increases with time, he shows that job 
rotation makes influence activities less attractive by reducing that time. As a result, the 
employee exerts more effort on his job. Through this incentive effect the firm is, again, 
able to learn about task productivity. 
Concerning employee productivity, Arya and Mittendorf (2006a) predict in their 
theoretical model that employees opt voluntarily for job rotation if they are highly-
skilled, i.e., have a high value of human capital because it emulates taking an attractive 
outside option that exists only for high-skilled employees. Consequently, this self-
selection leads to employer learning about employee productivity.  
Empirical evidence about the employer learning argument is rare. Exceptions are Ortega 
and Eriksson (2006) and Campion et al. (1994) who both find a negative relation of firm 
tenure with job rotation which, howerver, supports both employer and employee 
learning argument.  
Moreover, Ortega and Eriksson (2006) find that the growth rate of firms’ workforce and 
recruitment on the national level are positively related to the adoption of job rotation. 
They interpret this result as empirical evidence for the employer learning argument. 
Regarding the former variable, I expect that the employee learning argument can also 
explain the finding. My argument is that if the workforce grows, employees learn more 
easily about new colleagues through job rotation.  
Concerning the latter variable, recruitment on the national level, they only estimate a 
significant coefficient if they observe salary-paid employees in large firms which makes 
their result less representative. To conclude, they only provide weak empirical evidence 
for the employer learning argument. 
3.2.1.2 Employee motivation 
The employee motivation argument refers to psychological motivation through 
elimination of boredom if employee’s job is, for instance, monotonous (e.g., Walker and 
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Guest, 1952). Ference et al. (1977) state that job rotation can help to motivate plateaued 
employees who do not expect any career advancement. On the contrary, Campion et al. 
(1994) show empirically that job rotation is associated with promotions contradicting 
this statement. Eriksson and Ortega (2006) cannot find any empirical evidence for this 
argument. 
3.2.1.3 Employee learning 
The employee learning argument states that the employee acquires skills on different 
jobs within the same firm (Eriksson and Ortega, 2006). These skills can, for instance, 
lead to a better understanding of dependencies between jobs (Aoki, 1986) or are 
essential for managerial positions (Saari et al., 1988). 
One rare theoretical model related to employee learning is a model by Ruckes and 
Rønde (2014). They analyze incentives to overcome employee’s inertia to search for 
new projects for two periods of time. I interpret such searching effort as employee 
learning. In addition, they assume that job rotation denoted as restructuring induces the 
employee to search for new projects after the first period whereas it reduces searching 
effort for the first-period project. They conclude that job rotation is adopted if incentive 
pay to elicit employee learning is too costly.  
Campion et al. (1994) document that job rotation has a positive impact on acquisition of 
administrative and business skills but not on technical skills. So, more managerial skills 
are learned through job rotation. Besides, they observe a positive coefficient on the rate 
of job rotations explaining the rate of promotions. Further, they find a negative 
coefficient on employee’s firm tenure for explaining rate of rotation. These findings 
support the employee learning argument as preparation for career advancement.  
Eriksson and Ortega (2006) also detect this relation in their data and relate it to the 
employee as well as the employer learning argument. Kusunoki and Numagami (1998), 
however, find no statistically significant impact of firm tenure on job rotation but 
observe a statistically significant influence of job rotation on promotions.  
In addition, Eriksson and Ortega (2006) find a positive relation between training costs 
relative to the industry and adoption of job rotation supporting the employee learning 
argument. Other proxies they apply for employee learning such as firm size, employee 
heterogeneity, and average firm tenure, however, are hypothesized and found to have 
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the same signs for both the employer and employee learning arguments so that they 
cannot contribute to empirical evidence exclusive for one of these arguments. 
3.2.2 Hypotheses 
Ortega’s (2001) theoretical model which I base my hypotheses on assumes two 
employees i  who are assigned to two different jobs k for two periods of time t . The 
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ik represents employee i’s expected value of human capital specific to job k as, e.g., his 
ability (i.e., employee productivity) to conduct the tasks of the job k. 
k  denotes the 
expected value of job-specific nonhuman capital such as technology applied in the job. 
Thus, it reflects task productivity. 
kt  represents an exogenous shock to production. 
Ortega (2001) assumes that neither the firm nor the employees know a priori the values 
of these production components and have only beliefs about them following normal 
distributions with expected values of 0 and variances 2  (uncertainty about employee’s 
job-specific human capital), 
2
  (uncertainty about job-specific nonhuman capital), and 
2
  (uncertainty about an exogenous shock), respectively.  
The firm assigns the two employees to the two jobs according to a specialization and 
job rotation policy. During the following two periods of time, the firm learns about the 
value of different employee-job assignments and decides after the second period who to 
assign to which job to maximize firm value expressed by the sum of the two job 
production functions. 
According to the specialization policy, each employee is assigned to one of the two jobs 

























S  reveals that uncertainties about job-specific nonhuman capital and an exogenous 
shock decrease firm value whereas uncertainty about job-specific human capital 
increases firm value. 
According to the job rotation policy, each employee is assigned to different jobs in 
period one and both employees swap jobs in period two. Then, Ortega (2001) calculates 
an expected value of job rotation policy, 




















Again, uncertainty about an exogenous shock decreases firm value whereas uncertainty 
about job-specific human capital increases it.  
Uncertainty about job-specific nonhuman capital does not have an effect on firm value 
because it is eliminated by simply comparing both employees’ performances in the 
same job. Thus, the firm does not learn anything about the value of nonhuman capital.  
To compare both policies, he analyzes the difference of the expected values of both 




























Through differentiation he finds out that the values of  are always positive regardless 
of any value of the three uncertainties. So, a rotation policy is economically superior 
over a specialization policy.  
Moreover, he predicts that the more uncertain the firm is about job-specific human 
capital represented by 2 , the more valuable the job rotation policy is.  
Uncertainty about job-specific nonhuman capital (i.e.,
2
 ) increases the expected value 
added by job rotation in comparison to specialization.  
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Uncertainty about an exogenous shock (i.e.,
2
 ) decreases . 
Since I assume that firms maximize expected values of their production, I expect that 
firms adopt job rotation if a job rotation policy leads to a higher firm value than a 
specialization policy. 
Consequently, I formulate my hypotheses as follows: 
H1: If the firm is uncertain about job-specific human capital, it adopts job 
rotation. 
H2: If the firm is uncertain about job-specific nonhuman capital, it adopts job 
rotation. 




3.3 Sample description and specification of variables and 
models 
3.3.1 Sample description 
I use cross-national data from the Fourth and Fifth European Working Conditions 
Survey (EWCS)29 that took place in 2005 (4th) and 2010 (5th) and was conducted by the 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.30 The 
combined sample contains residents of the European Union and other European 
countries who are older than 15 years, work in all industries of the private sector and 
live in 35 European countries.31 
The surveys intended to gain information about European working conditions regarding 
organization of work, communication and management styles, work-life balance and 
compensation schemes. 
The questionnaire-based interviews of the surveys were conducted at the homes of the 
respondents so that it is unlikely that answers were given strategically to influence 
employers (Ortega, 2009). The response rates were on average 44.2 percent (European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2010) and 47 
percent (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 
2005), respectively.  
The original sample size amounts to 73,496 observations. I exclude state institutions, 
industries referring to armed forces or household activities because I assume that their 
incentive schemes are quite different from private, profit-oriented firms. I filter out self-
employed and non-employed respondents to focus on employees in firms.  
After filtering out observations with missing values, I obtain a sample of 26,957 
observations (i.e., employees).  
                                                 
29 Data is available on http://www.eurofound.europa.eu 
30 The Fourth and the antecedent EWCS are used in some studies such as Nienhüser and Matiaske (2006), 
Daniels et al. (2007), and Ortega (2009). 
31 Countries are the EU-27 countries in 2012 (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden and 
United Kingdom), Norway, Croatia, Turkey, Switzerland, Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro.  
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Random route selection was applied so that a sample selection bias is unlikely. In 
addition, due to this approach it is unlikely that a respondent or firm is contained twice 
in the sample so that cluster effects for a respondent or firm are negligible. 
3.3.2 Specification of variables 
3.3.2.1 Proxy variable for adoption of job rotation 
As proxy for adoption of job rotation I choose the dummy variable 
ROTATING_TASKS which is set to ‘1’ if task rotation between the employee and her 
colleagues occur. I also interpret task rotation as job rotation because a task can also be 
seen as a job. So, it is just an issue of the level of aggregation. Campion et al. (1994) 
find out in interviews with executives that the jobs are mostly within one function, e.g., 
from accounting to treasury within the finance department. Their finding supports that 
task rotation likely represents job rotation.  
In addition, I expect that task rotation is the least costly version of job rotation. Reasons 
are that loss of job-specific human capital (Kwon, 2006) and trainings for new skills 
(Campion and McClelland, 1991) are less likely for task rotation because next jobs 
might be very similar with regard to skill requirements. Consequently, my analysis is 
not expected be influenced materially by costs of job rotation. 
3.3.2.2 Proxy variable for uncertainty about job-specific human capital 
I assume that the firm is uncertain about job-specific human capital in particular if the 
employee utilizes human capital which he has not acquired through processes provided 
by the firm such as trainings. To detect employees with such type of human capital, I 
pick the question referring to whether the interviewed employee is able to apply his own 
ideas in his work. Based on this question, I define a variable, OWN_IDEAS, which 
carries values from ‘0’ (‘almost never’) to ‘4’ (‘almost always’). Then, I assume that the 
higher the value of OWN_IDEAS is, the more likely the firm is uncertain about job-
specific human capital. 
3.3.2.3 Proxy variable for the uncertainty about job-specific nonhuman capital 
As proxy variable for the uncertainty about job-specific nonhuman capital I include the 
dummy variable COMPLEX_TASKS whose value of ‘1’ indicates if the job contains 
complex tasks.  
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Ortega (2009) chooses the same variable to proxy for specific knowledge that denotes 
knowledge that is too costly to transfer to the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1992).32 He 
documents empirically a positive relation between job complexity and the provision of 
different performance pay schemes and the level of employee’s discretion. His findings 
support model predictions by Prendergast (2002) and Raith (2008). The fact that 
Raith (2008) regards specific knowledge as private information about task productivity 
supports the choice of COMPLEX_TASKS to reflect uncertainty about job-specific 
human capital.  
3.3.2.4 Proxy variable for noise 
As proxy variable for noise (i.e., uncertainty about an exogenous shock), I include the 
four-step scaled variable NOISE which reflects the frequency of task interruptions 
caused by unforeseen tasks. Its values range from ‘0’ (‘never’) to ‘3’ (‘very often’).  
I regard the unforeseen interruptions as exogenous shocks because the employee does 
not predict them and they decrease his job performance through interrupting his tasks. 
Hence, the higher the value of NOISE, the more likely the firm is uncertain about an 
exogenous shock. 
3.3.2.5 Control variables 
Since the sample is very heterogeneous, it is important to include several control 
variables which can be correlated with the dependent variable ROTATING_TASKS, 
and the explanatory variables of interest, COMPLEX_TASKS, OWN_IDEAS, and 
NOISE.33 
To identify a dependency of a job on other jobs, I choose the dummy variable 
COLL_DEPEND which is set to ‘1’ if the pace of the employee’s work depends on 
colleagues’ work. Noise can be caused by such dependency but I expect that an 
employee has influence on such noise. In this case, noise does not reflect an exogenous 
shock. Since I observe a positive correlation coefficient between NOISE and 
COLL_DEPEND, this expectation is supported. Consequently, inclusion of 
                                                 
32 Ortega (2009) analyzes if answers about COMPLEX_TASKS are biased because respondent’s 
perception of job complexity could vary with skills. He ascertains that this is rather unlikely because less 
experienced employees work on less complex tasks. 




COLL_DEPEND reduces the likelihood that NOISE does not only measure exogenous, 
but also controllable shocks. 
I also include dummy variables for gender (GENDER), the level of education 
(ISCED_X), age (AGE), and firm tenure (TENURE and its squared version, 
TENURE*TENURE).34 
Occupational effects are taken into account by dummy variables, ISCO_X, according to 
the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) code.  
I control for a managerial position by the binary variable SUBORDINATES that 
exhibits a value of ‘1’ if the employee has at least one subordinate as well as by the 
dummy variable ISCO_1 (i.e., management position). 
To control for the level of risk, earnings and regulations across industries, I add thirteen 
industry dummy variables according the NACE code (in French: Nomenclature 
Statistique des Activités Économiques dans la Communauté Européenne). 
To address firm size, I include seven dummy variables, UNIT_SIZE_X, based on 
answers of the question referring to the size of the workplace or local premise of the 
establishment.35 
Furthermore, I account for different levels of educational and economic states among 
countries by adding country dummy variables, COUNTRY_X, to the models. I control 
for time effects through the year dummy variable, YEAR2010, (value of ’1’ for year 
2010). 
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics about all variables of the sample is shown in Table 3.1.  
Consistent with Osterman (1994), task rotation is adopted in 49.4 percent of all 
observations. The mean of complex tasks is 57.6 percent. The likelihood that employees 
                                                 
34 According to Eriksson and Ortega (2006), job rotation is correlated with TENURE. A squared version 
of AGE is not included because then variance inflation factors would be very high because of its high 
correlation with TENURE and TENURE*TENURE. 
35 This approach is consistent with Ortega (2009) as well as the official reports EWCS (2005) and EWCS 
(2010) which both regard those variables as firm size proxy variables. As already mentioned in Chapter 
two, these variables can only be seen as lower bound of the real firm size so that estimates of coefficients 
should be taken with caution. Also the fact that 2.7 percent of the employees in the sample have a 




can apply their own ideas represented by OWN_IDEAS has a mean of 2.39 that is 
above the midpoint of its scale of 2. 
NOISE with a mean value of 1.16 seems to be low on average because its mean is 
below the midpoint of its scale of 1.5. 15.9 percent of all employees have subordinates 
(SUBORDINATES) and 5.8 percent have a management position. 51.1 percent are 
dependent on their colleagues’ pace of work (COLL_DEPEND). 
55.0 percent of employees are male with an average age of 39.04 years who have been 
working in the firm for 8 years on average. The most (least) employees live in Belgium 
(6.4 percent) (Albania (9.5 percent)), work in the manufacturing sector (24.5 percent) 
(fishing sector (0.2 percent)), are service worker, shop and market sales worker (19.3 
percent) (skilled agricultural and fishery workers (1.0 percent)) and completed upper 
secondary education (47.7 percent) (second stage of tertiary education (0.6 percent)).  
Most of employees (32.6 percent) work in a workplace of a size between 10 and 49 
employees whereas least of them (1.7 percent) in a workplace of the size of one 
employee. 59.5 percent of observations took place in 2010. 
Before estimation, I estimate a Pearson correlation matrix of all independent variables 
to check for multicollinearity problems (exhibited in Table 3.2). For the variables of 
interest, I observe neither any correlation coefficients above critical levels of 0.8 (see 
for a thorough analysis about multicollinearity Mason and Perreault, 1991) nor variance 
inflation factors (vif) below the critical value of 10 (Kennedy, 2008). Therefore, I do not 












Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics. Variables are defined as described in Table 3.5.  
 Entire sample  
 (N=26,957) 
Variables Mean Standard deviation. 
ROTATING_TASKS 0.494 0.500 
INDV_PPAY 0.151 0.358 
PROFIT_SHARE 0.132 0.339 
EQUITY_COMP 0.032 0.177 
COMPLEX_TASKS 0.576 0.494 
OWN_IDEAS 2.386 1.393 
NOISE 1.241 0.949 
COLL_DEPEND 0.511 0.500 
ISCED_0_2 0.249 0.433 
ISCED_3 0.456 0.498 
ISCED_4 0.070 0.256 
ISCED_5 0.215 0.411 
ISCED_6 0.010 0.010 
SUBORDINATES 0.159 0.366 
GENDER 0.550 0.497 
AGE 39.042 11.662 
TENURE 8.002 8.6937 
ISCO_1 0.058 0.233 
ISCO_2 0.085 0.278 
ISCO_3 0.135 0.342 
ISCO_4 0.135 0.342 
ISCO_5 0.177 0.382 
ISCO_6 0.009 0.094 
ISCO_7 0.170 0.376 
ISCO_8 0.112 0.315 
ISCO_9 0.119 0.324 
UNIT_SIZE_1 0.017 0.130 
UNIT_SIZE_2_4 0.153 0.360 
UNIT_SIZE_5_9 0.189 0.391 
UNIT_SIZE_10_49 0.326 0.469 
UNIT_SIZE_50_99 0.102 0.303 
UNIT_SIZE_100_249 0.094 0.292 
UNIT_SIZE_250_499 0.048 0.213 
UNIT_SIZE_500+ 0.070 0.256 
AGRICULT_HUNT_FOREST 0.023 0.150 
FISHING 0.002 0.040 
MINING_QUARRYING 0.006 0.080 
MANUFACTURING 0.245 0.430 
SUPPLY 0.014 0.119 
CONSTRUCTION 0.093 0.290 
WHOLESALE_RETAIL_TRADE 0.214 0.410 
HOTELS_RESTAURANTS 0.066 0.248 
TRANSPORT_STORAGE_COM 0.064 0.245 
FINANCIALS 0.046 0.209 
REAL_ESTATE_OTHERS 0.156 0.362 
PUBLIC_ADMINISTRATION 0.009 0.092 
EDUCATION 0.017 0.130 
HEALTH_SOCIAL_WORK 0.046 0.210 




Table 3.2: Correlation matrix. Variables are defined as described in Table 3.5. Entire sample (N=26,957) is applied here. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 ROTATING_TASK 1                  
2 INDV_PPAY 0.008 1                 
3 PROFIT_SHARE 0.036*** 0.100*** 1                
4 EQUITY_COMP 0.020*** 0.054*** 0.284*** 1               
5 COMPLEX_TASKS 0.089*** 0.031*** 0.121*** 0.067*** 1              
6 OWN_IDEAS 0.034*** -0.016*** 0.101*** 0.062*** 0.209*** 1             
7 NOISE 0.142*** -0.043*** 0.098*** 0.064*** 0.216*** 0.148*** 1            
8 COLL_DEPEND 0.213*** 0.056*** 0.017*** 0.013** 0.108*** -0.040*** 0.124*** 1           
9 SUBORDINATES 0.036*** -0.006 0.139*** 0.099*** 0.162*** 0.215*** 0.168*** 0.084*** 1          
10 GENDER 0.031*** 0.070*** 0.079*** 0.054*** 0.116*** 0.067*** -0.010* 0.085*** 0.097*** 1         
11 AGE -0.056*** -0.027*** 0.029*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.065*** -0.025*** -0.067*** 0.093*** 0.019*** 1        
12 TENURE -0.006 -0.018*** 0.075*** 0.087*** 0.093*** 0.078*** 0.049*** -0.008* 0.130*** 0.082*** 0.527*** 1       
13 TENURE*TENURE -0.006 -0.018*** 0.057*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.061*** 0.035*** -0.010* 0.099*** 0.080*** 0.465*** 0.937*** 1      
14 ISCED_3 0.024*** 0.060*** -0.031*** -0.038*** -0.049*** -0.058*** -0.052*** 0.002 -0.088*** 0.001 -0.074*** -0.033*** -0.028*** 1     
15 ISCED_4 0.011* -0.010 -0.007 -0.006 0.028*** 0.045*** 0.024*** 0.005 0.018*** -0.032*** 0.004 -0.010 -0.006 -0.251*** 1    
16 ISCED_5 -0.028*** -0.038*** 0.152*** 0.099*** 0.171*** 0.160*** 0.142*** -0.001 0.169*** -0.033*** -0.012* -0.026*** -0.032*** -0.479*** -0.144*** 1   
17 ISCED_6 -0.004 -0.019*** 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.060*** 0.055*** 0.042*** -0.009 0.074*** 0.024*** 0.005 -0.012** -0.014** -0.092*** -0.028*** -0.053*** 1          




3.3.4 Specification of models 









If the coefficient on OWN_IDEAS is positive and statistically significant for 
ROTATING_TASKS, H1 is confirmed. 
If the coefficient on COMPLEX_TASKS is positive and statistically significant for 
ROTATING_TASKS, H2 is confirmed. 
If the coefficient on NOISE is positive and statistically significant for 
ROTATING_TASKS, H3 is confirmed. 
I calculate clustered robust standard errors for all variables by choosing year, country 
and industry dummy variables as cluster variables (see for the necessity of clustered 
robust standard errors Petersen, 2009). Besides, I calculate McFadden’s likelihood ratio 
index (LRI) (McFadden, 1974) to measure goodness of fit. 
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3.4 Empirical results and their discussion 
3.4.1 Empirical results 
The results for M1 are depicted in Table 3.3. The coefficient on OWN_IDEAS is 
positive and statistically significant at the one percent level confirming H1. It reflects 
that the firm adopts job rotation if it is uncertain about job-specific human capital. 
The coefficient on COMPLEX_TASKS is positive and statistically significant at the 
one percent level confirming H2. It reflects that the firm adopts job rotation if it is 
uncertain about job-specific nonhuman capital. 
The coefficient on NOISE is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level 
confirming H3. It reflects that the firm adopts job rotation if the employee’s job 
performance is likely influenced by an exogenous shock. 
Some findings about the control variables are worth mentioning. SUBORDINATES is 
positively related to the adoption of job rotation (statistically significant at p < 0.1). This 
result can be explained by the employee learning argument that in particular employees 
of higher ranks who have subordinates rotate to advance their career (Saari et al., 1988). 
It can also support Müller’s (2011) argument that managers should rotate to cure a 
possible confirmation bias in their decision making.  
The negative coefficient on ISCO_1 (i.e., manager), however, contradicts these 
arguments. I suggest that the negative coefficient reflects the employer learning 
argument if employer learning about managers is less important than about rank and 
file. One reason for this argument can be that the firm is represented by managers who 
likely were in the same positions than the ISCO_1 managers. As a result, their 
uncertainty about job-specific human capital for those jobs is smaller than for jobs of 
the rank and file. Alternatively, the negative coefficient can also be explained by the 
employee motivation argument that managerial jobs are not boring and thus job rotation 
is, then, less necessary. 
The positive relation of COLL_DEPEND with ROTATING_TASKS (statistically 
significant at p < 0.01) show that the firm adopts job rotation if the employee is 
dependent on other colleagues. If I interpret such dependency as job-specific nonhuman 
capital because it is part of job design and cannot be modified by the employee himself, 
it also supports the employer learning argument. 
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Table 3.3: Main models about job rotation. Variables are defined as described in Table 
3.5. Asterisks at standard errors denote statistical significance at the 0.01(***), 
0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level. 
 M1 (PROBIT) M2 (LPM) 
Sample Entire sample Entire sample 


































































N 26,957 26,957 
McFadden-LRI (PROBIT)/R2 (LPM) 0.0979 0.1270 
The negative coefficient on AGE (statistically significant at p < 0.01) could be 
explained by the employer learning argument that the firms knows more about older 
employees than about younger. Alternatively, the older the employee the less likely he 
needs to learn new things reflecting the employee learning argument. Champion et al. 
(2001) and Ortega and Eriksson (2006) also document these arguments with firm 
tenure. On the contrary, my firm tenure variables lack statistical significance. 
3.4.2 Discussion about alternative theories about employer learning 
My findings are also consistent with alternative theories about the employer learning 
argument. Ickes and Samuelson (1987) also predict that the firm adopts job rotation if it 
is uncertain about task productivity. The positive coefficient on COMPLEX_TASKS is 
consistent with that. 
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Eguchi (2005) shows that job rotation is adopted if performance measurement is noisy. 
The positive coefficient on NOISE is consistent with this prediction. 
Arya and Mittendorf (2004) demonstrate that the employee reports truthfully about his 
private information about task productivity in the case of job rotation. The positive 
coefficient on COMPLEX_TASKS is consistent with that expectation. 
Arya and Mittendorf’s (2006a) model assumes that the employee can opt for job 
rotation voluntarily. Then, if the employee chooses job rotation, he signals high 
employee productivity. Hence, the positive coefficient on OWN_IDEAS which reflects 
uncertainty about employee productivity supports their prediction. 
3.4.3 Discussion about alternative arguments of job rotation 
3.4.3.1 Employee motivation argument 
My findings are inconsistent with the employee motivation argument: If job rotation 
avoided boredom as driver for employee motivation, I would find negative coefficients 
on COMPLEX_TASKS, OWN_IDEAS, and NOISE because high values of each of 
these variables signal a low likelihood of boredom: Job complexity and applying his 
own ideas obviously require more intellectual activities. In addition, more noise triggers 
more versatile activities. 
3.4.3.2 Employee learning argument 
My results are also inconsistent with the employee learning argument of job rotation for 
several reasons: COMPLEX_TASKS as proxy variable for uncertainty of job-specific 
nonhuman capital does not refer to employee’s human capital. Since such human capital 
is acquired by employee learning, COMPLEX_TASKS is not linked to employee 
learning. 
OWN_IDEAS, however, can be related to employee learning in the sense that if the 
employee is not able to use his own ideas, he must learn from the firm how to conduct 
his job. As a result, if the employee learning argument had driven my results, the 
coefficients on OWN_IDEAS would have been negative rather than positive as I 
actually estimate. 
Lastly, since an exogenous shock as represented by NOISE is supposed to be unique 




3.5 Robustness analyses 
3.5.1 Alternative model specifications 
Since OWN_IDEAS is not a dummy variable, I estimate M1 with 
OWN_IDEAS*OWN_IDEAS, i.e., the squared version of OWN_IDEAS, or replace 
OWN_IDEAS with LN_OWN_IDEAS, the logarithm of (OWN_IDEAS+1). Then, I 
obtain the same qualitative results (not reported). 
Since NOISE is also continuously scaled, I include LN_NOISE, i.e., the logarithm of 
(NOISE+1), instead of NOISE, or add its squared version, NOISE*NOISE, to M1. All 
those alternative specifications do not yield any other qualitative results as documented 
with M1 (not reported). Though, the marginal effect on NOISE*NOISE is negative and 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Since its coefficient is rather small (-
0.021) compared to the one of NOISE (0.113), the net effect of any value of NOISE is 
always positively correlated to ROTATING_TASKS supporting H3. 
3.5.2 Robustness analysis about interpretation of OWN_IDEAS 
Ortega (2001) also predicts that the profitability of a job rotation policy over a 
specialization policy increases with the level of firm’s uncertainty about job-specific 
human capital. According to Eriksson and Ortega (2006), uncertainty about human 
capital is lower, the longer the employee works in the firm (TENURE). Hence, I interact 
OWN_IDEAS with TENURE36 and expect a negative coefficient reflecting that lower 
uncertainty about job-specific human capital is related to less likely adoption of job 












I choose a linear probability model (LPM) because then the coefficient on the 
interaction term can be interpreted directly and without further manipulation that is 
necessary in the case of probit models according to Ai and Norton (2003). In spite of the 
nonlinearity in the relation of OWN_IDEAS with ROTATING_TASKS, LPM is also 
acceptable in the case of a binary dependent variable (Wooldridge, 2013). 
                                                 
36 Though firm tenure is not always equal to job tenure, but job tenure can never be greater than firm 
tenure, firm tenure is a proxy for the upper bound of job tenure. Due to this, following empirical results 
must be taken with caution. 
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Table 3.4: Robustness analyses. Variables are defined as described in Table 3.5. 
Asterisks at standard errors denote statistical significance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) 
and 0.10(*)-level. 
 
As hypothesized, I observe a negative and statistically significant at the ten percent level 
coefficient on OWN_IDEAS*TENURE (depicted in Table 3.3). This finding documents 
a positive relation of the level of uncertainty about job-specific human capital and 
adoption of job rotation.  
The fact that the coefficient on OWN_IDEAS remains positive and statistically 
significant at the one percent level and the coefficient on TENURE is not statistically 
significant support my assumption that OWN_IDEAS refers to firm’s uncertainty about 
employee’s job-specific human capital. 
 
 
 M6 (SURE) 
Sample Entire sample 
Variables 
ROTATING_ 





























































































































R2 0.1269 0.0742 0.1421 0.0679 
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3.5.3 Additional analyses of COMPLEX_TASKS and NOISE 
Now, I analyze relations of COMPLEX_TASKS and NOISE with different types of 
explicit incentives such as individual performance pay, a profit sharing plan, and equity 
compensation to rule out alternative interpretations and to support my interpretations 
about the two variables. 
As individual-based performance pay proxy variable I choose a dummy variable, 
INDV_PPAY whose value is set to ‘1’ if the question about the inclusion of a piece rate 
or productivity payments in the remuneration is answered positively. A profit sharing 
plan is represented by the dummy variable PROFIT_SHARE and equity compensation 
by the dummy variable EQUITY_COMP.37 
INDV_PPAY is most prevalent in the sample with a share of 15.2 percent among all 
types of incentives including a profit sharing plan, PROFIT_SHARING, (10.9 percent) 
and equity compensation, EQUITY_COMP (2.4 percent). 





















The SURE model takes explicitly into account that the firm decides about incentives 
and job rotation simultaneously that potentially leads to correlated disturbances 
(Greene, 2013).39 Ortega (2009) also applies a SURE model to regress binary proxy 
variables for the provision of different incentives on job complexity. The Breusch-
Pagan test for independent equations (Breusch and Pagan, 1980) is significant at the one 
percent level showing that disturbances are, in fact, correlated.  
Raith (2008) predict that job complexity is positively related to all types of performance 
pay. Consistently, I observe a positive and statistically at the one percent level (for 
                                                 
37 EWCS2005 contains a question which refers to ‘Payments based in the overall performance of a group’ 
(i.e., group-based bonus). I do not choose this variable because it is only available for 2005. 
38 The concept of a SURE model is introduced by Zellner (1962) 
39 Due to computational burdens (Greene, 2013), I cannot estimate a multivariate probit model for that 
analysis. It is not disadvantageous because Wooldridge (2013) states that a linear probability model such 
as the SURE model is acceptable in the case of a binary dependent variable. 
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INDV_PPAY and PROFIT_SHARE) and at the five percent level (for 
EQUITY_COMP) coefficient on COMPLEX_TASKS (depicted in Table 3.4).40 
Another argument could be that COMPLEX_TASKS reflects noise (e.g. Kettenring et 
al., 2014; Mintzberg, 1973; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998) because task complexity means 
more possibilities of exogenous shocks. If this were true, I would observe a negative 
coefficient on COMPLEX_TASKS for INDV_PPAY. Besides, I control in my 
equations with NOISE for noise, so that COMPLEX_TASKS should not capture noise. 
In the case of NOISE, I observe a negative and statistically significant at the five 
percent level coefficient for INDV_PPAY that is consistent with standard moral hazard 
models about a negative relation of noise and performance pay (e.g., Gibbons, 2005; 
Prendergast, 1999; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
On the contrary, for PROFIT_SHARE and EQUITY_COMP the coefficients on NOISE 
are positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. Group-based 
performance pay schemes are provided in particular if the firm intends to induce 
cooperation among employees (e.g., Hwang et al., 2008; Siemsen et al., 2007; Drago 
and Turnbull, 1988; Wageman and Baker, 1997; Wageman, 1995; Hamilton et al., 
2003). Since NOISE reflects how often the employee has to interrupt his task to take on 
an unpredicted task, it likely refers to situations when the unforeseen task is helping 
others that the firm also wants to incentivize through firm-based performance pay. As 
Drago and Turnbull (1988) show theoretically, individual-based performance pay does 
not incorporate helping behavior performance and thus helping requests by the 
employee’s colleagues are noise to the employee’s individual performance 
measurement. Then, one can argue that NOISE reflects uncertainty about job-specific 
nonhuman or human capital if one task in his job is to help others and thus is job-
specific. Since that task is unpredicted, I assume that helping others is not a regular part 
of his job and thus distracts him as exogenous shock from job-specific performance. 
According to this argument, NOISE, in fact, measures noise to performance 
measurement.
                                                 
40 Ortega (2009) also adopts this view when he regresses different incentives on COMPLEX_TASKS 
applying a very similar sample of the EWCS. All his results are consistent with mine, except in the case 
of INDV_PPAY he observes an insignificant coefficient on COMPLEX_TASKS. One reason for this 
different finding could be that he does not include as many control variables as I do. In particular, he does 




Consistent with Ortega (2001), my empirical study documents that a firm adopts job 
rotation if it is uncertain about job-specific employee’s human capital or nonhuman 
capital, or employee’s job performance is influenced by an exogenous shock. 
In addition, I show that my findings are consistent with alternative theoretical models of 
the employer learning argument. Moreover, I show that the employee motivation and 
employee learning arguments of job rotation do not explain my results. All my findings 
are robust against model specification and variable interpretation concerns.  
Suggestions for future research 
My analysis, though, lacks to document whether or not adoption of job rotation leads to 
higher job performance (i.e., firm value) as Ortega (2001) shows. Thus, I can only 
suppose that my findings show a positive relation of job rotation to firm performance if 
the firm opts for a job rotation policy only if it is value-maximizing. Hence, it would be 
fruitful for future research to extend the analysis to performance data.  
In addition, it would be advantageous to have panel data to track job assignments and 
job performance over time to reveal learning effects of job rotation for assignment 





Table 3.5: Definitions of variables. 
Variable Question in EWCS 2005 
(EWSC 2010) 
Definition 
Variables of Interest 
COMPLEX_TASKS q23e. Does your main paid job 
involve: complex tasks? (q49e. 
Generally, does your main paid job 
involve complex tasks?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ if 
respondent’s job involves complex 
tasks and to ‘0’ otherwise. 
EQUITY_COMP ef6i. What does your remuneration 
include: Income from shares in the 
company your work for? (ef7i. 
Thinking about your earnings from 
your main job, what do they include 
- Income from shares in the 
company your work for?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ if 
remuneration includes stock of the 
firm and to ‘0’ otherwise 
INDV_PPAY ef6b. What does your remuneration 
include: Piece rate or productivity 
payments? (ef7b. Thinking about 
your earnings from your main job, 
what do they include - Piece rate or 
productivity payments?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ if 
remuneration includes an individual 
bonus (e.g. piece rate or productivity 
payments) and to ‘0’ otherwise 
NOISE q22a. How often do you have to 
interrupt a task you are doing in 
order to take on an unforeseen task? 
(q47. How often do you have to 
interrupt a task you are doing in 
order to take on an unforeseen task?) 
Numeric variable that ranges from ‘0’ 
(‘never’) to ‘3’ (‘very often’): 
approximation for work interruptions 
LN_NOISE  = ln(NOISE+1) 
OWN_IDEAS q25j. Are you able to apply your 
own ideas in your work? (q51i. 
Select the response which best 
describes your work situation – You 
are able to apply your own ideas in 
Numeric variable that ranges from ‘0’ 
(‘never’ (‘almost never’)) to ‘4’ 




OWN_IDEAS_2  = OWN_IDEAS * OWN_IDEAS 
LN_OWN_IDEAS  = ln(OWN_IDEAS+1) 
PROFIT_SHARE ef6g. What does your remuneration 
include: Payments based on the 
overall performance of the company 
where you work? (ef7g. Thinking 
about your earnings from your main 
job, what do they include - Payments 
based on the overall performance of 
the company where you work?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ if 
remuneration includes payments 
based on company performance and 
to ‘0’ otherwise 
ROTATING_TASKS q26a. Does your job involve rotating 
tasks between yourself and 
colleagues? (q53. Does your job 
involve rotating tasks between 
yourself and colleagues?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ if 
respondent faces task rotation with 
colleagues and to ‘0’ otherwise. 
Control variables 
AGE hh2b. Age-Respondent (hh2b. Age – 
Respondent) 
Numeric, continuous variable for 
years of age 
Country variables 
(COUNTRY_X) 
Country where interview was 
conducted 
34 dummy variables for 35 European 
countries  
COLL_DEPEND q21a. Is your pace of work 
dependent on the work done by 
colleagues? (q46a. On the whole, is 
your pace of work dependent, or not, 
on the work done by colleagues?) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ if 
respondent answers ‘yes’ and to ‘0’ 
otherwise. 
GENDER hh2a. Sex – Respondent (hh2a. Sex 
– Respondent) 
Dummy variable that is set to ‘1’ for a 
male respondent and ‘0’ for female 
Education variables 
(ISCED_X) 
ISCED classification: the highest 
level of education or training  
4 dummy variables indicating level 
(X) of education with value of ‘1’ and 
‘0’ otherwise:  
(X = 0..2) Below Upper secondary 
education (not included) 
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(X = 3) Upper secondary education 
(X = 4) Post-secondary including pre-
vocational education   
(X = 5) Tertiary education – first level 
(X = 6) Tertiary education – advanced 
level  
Industry variables  
(NACE_X) 
According to NACE industry 
classification 
14 dummy variables for different 
















ISCO Occupation classification 8 dummy variables for different 
occupations with X representing 
respective codes according to ISCO 
nomenclature: 
(X=1) Legislators, senior officials  
and managers 
(X=2) Professionals 
(X=3) Technicians and associate  
Professionals 
(X=4) Clerks 
(X=5) Service workers and shop 
 and market sales workers 




(X=7) Craft and related trades  
workers 
(X=8) Plant and machine operators  
and assemblers 




q6. How many people in total work 
in the local unit of the establishment 
where you work? (q11. How many 
people in total work at your 
workplace?) 
7 dummy variables with the size X: 
(X = 1) 1 (not included) 
(X = 2_4) 2-4 
(X = 5_9) 5-9 
(X = 10_49) 10-49 
(X = 50_99) 50-99 
(X = 100_249) 100-249 
(X = 250_499) 250-499 
(X = 500+) 500 or more 
SUBORDINATES q7. How many people work under 
your supervision? (q17. How many 
people work under your supervision, 
for whom pay increases, bonuses or 
promotion depend directly on you?) 
Dummy variable set to ‘1’ if 
employee have at least one 
subordinate and to ‘0’ otherwise 
TENURE q2d. How many years have you been 
in your company or organisation? 
(q12. How many years have you 
been in your company or 
organisation?) 
Numeric, continuous variable for 
years of employment in current firm 
YEAR2010  Dummy variable is set to ‘1’ if 
interview took place in 2010 and to 




Internal Governance of Firms 
4.1. Introduction 
Since ownership and control in publicly-held firms are separated, practitioners and 
scholars examine issues of corporate governance that address instruments and 
mechanisms such as monitoring of CEOs by boards of directors which align the CEOs’ 
interest with shareholders’ interest to maximize shareholder value (e.g., Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).  
Since the CEOs are self-interested (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Morck et al., 1990; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1989) and boards are generous towards CEOs (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004), 
Acharya et al. (2011) doubt that this kind of monitoring is effective. Alternatively, they 
suggest that a manager below the CEO denoted as young manager is a better monitor. 
The reason for it is that he can observe CEO’s activities closely and possesses inside 
information to assess whether or not CEO’s activities maximize shareholder value.  
If the CEO is myopic, he does not care about preserving firm value after his dismissal 
and due to this is more willing to conduct value-destructive activities such as 
consumption of perks or getting excessive compensation. If the young manager 
identifies these activities and the CEO is dependent on cash flows the young manager 
generates, he is able to prevent such activities by exerting less effort to generate such 
cash flows. Then, the CEO is willing to commit to invest in the firm’s capital stock to 
preserve firm value because it induces the young manager to exert effort to provide 
these cash flows. In this case, Acharya et al. (2011) assume that the young manager is 
induced to do so if he inherits the firm from the incumbent CEO in the future, 
technically by getting promoted to the CEO position. Therefore, he is interested that the 
CEO invests cash flows rather than privately consume them.41 Acharya et al. (2011) call 
this mechanism internal governance.  
Since in reality the CEO also contributes to firm’s cash flows, Acharya et al. (2011) 
analyze situations in which cash flows are partially contributed by the CEO and 
                                                 
41 Fama (1980) also discusses monitoring by CEO’s subordinates. Contrary to Acharya et al. (2011), he 
argues that bad firm performance can influence adversely their outside options and due to this they are 
motivated to contribute to good firm performance by monitoring the CEO. 
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partially by the young manager (no other managers are involved here). Following their 
reasoning, they demonstrate theoretically that a myopic CEO maximizes firm’s long-
term investments (i.e., capital stock) if neither he nor the young manager dominantly 
contributes to firm’s cash flows. This finding is reflected by a hump-shaped relation of 
firm’s long-term investments and myopic CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows 
relative to the young manager’s contribution.  
In this Chapter, I document this hump-shaped relation by showing that capital 
expenditures as measure of firm’s long-term investments are maximized if CEO’s 
contribution to firm’s cash flows is neither too small nor too large relative to his 
subordinated managers.  
As proxy variable for the CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows I choose the number 
of the firm’s reportable operating segments at the beginning of the observed firm-year. I 
argue that more operating segments lead to more cash flow diversification among all 
subordinated managers that causes more CEO’s influence (i.e., contribution) on firm’s 
aggregated cash flows generation. The reason for it is that the young manager who is 
induced by promotion incentives to conduct tasks of internal governance contributes 
less to firm’s aggregated cash flows if the number of segments and consequently the 
level of cash flow diversification increase. Alternative arguments from the literature 
regarding CEO’s ability and CEO entrenchment (e.g., Rose and Shepard, 1997) caused 
by more segments also support my choice of number of segments.  
Moreover, Acharya et al. (2011) assume that a far-sighted CEO always undertakes long-
term investments. In this case, CEO’s cash flow contribution has no effect on CEO’s 
investment behavior. Consistently, I document that the hump-shaped relation between 
firm’s long-term investments and CEO’s cash flow contribution disappears if the CEO 
is likely not myopic. I identify such far-sighted CEO if his compensation is more 
sensitive to firm’s shareholder value than the median CEO’s sensitivity in my sample. 
For my empirical study, I use panel data about 73 S&P 500 firms that have at least one 
internal promotion between 2004 and 2011. My results are robust if I control for 
alternative corporate governance instruments such as institutional ownership, 




My analysis contributes to a new strand of literature that deals with internal governance 
conducted by CEOs’ subordinated managers. Regarding this field, empirical work is 
rare. Exceptions are Landier et al. (2012) and the working paper by Aggarwal et al. 
(2013). Contrary to Landier et al. (2012) who analyze senior managers’ dependencies 
on their CEOs, I address Acharya’s (2011) internal governance mechanism contingent 
on CEO’s cash flow contribution.  
Aggarwal et al. (2013) also addresses this model: They measure CEO’s cash flow 
contribution as the number of CEO’s corporate titles relative to all titles of the top-five 
executives who he also belongs to.  
The remainder of the Chapter is organized as follows: In Chapter 4.2, I provide a short 
literature review about internal governance and derive my hypotheses from Acharya’s 
(2011) model. Chapter 4.3 contains a sample description and all model and variable 
specifications. Chapter 4.4 presents the empirical results and discusses them. Chapter 
4.5 provides some robustness analyses. Chapter 4.6 concludes.
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4.2. Literature review and hypotheses 
4.2.1 Literature review about internal governance 
Landier et al. (2012) document that the more members of the top management team 
have been appointed by the incumbent CEO the worse firm performance (represented 
by Tobin’s Q and return on assets) is. Their findings suggest that managers who have 
been appointed by the CEO are more aligned to their CEO’s (self-) interest. Though, 
their empirical model does not suit Acharya’s et al. (2011) model and cannot document 
their model predictions. 
The working paper by Aggarwal et al (2013) provides empirical evidence about 
Acharya’s (2011) model. As proxy for CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows they 
choose the number of corporate titles assigned to the CEO relative to the top-five 
executives who also include him and are reported in the database ExecuComp. Then, 
they find a hump-shaped relation of their measure of CEO’s contribution and firm 
investments measured as capital expenditures. They also find such relation of CEO’s 
contribution to firm performance measured as industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q and 
industry-adjusted return on assets. 
As an alternative way of analyzing CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows, Aggarwal 
et al. (2013) also test Bebchuk’s et al. (2011) CEO pay slice that measures the 
percentage of CEO total compensation relative to top five executives’ total 
compensation.42 Then, they show a hump-shaped relation of CEO pay slice with firm 
investments and performance. This relation, however, lacks statistical significance after 
inclusion of their corporate title variable. Hence, they conclude that their measure is the 
better proxy for CEO’s cash flow contribution. Nevertheless, their approach suffers 
from one endogeneity problem which they do not address43: Their measure of cash flow 
contribution is sensitive to the combination of different corporate titles because they 
have different impact on generating cash flows. The title ‘president’, for instance, refers 
to a corporate role with a higher impact on cash flow generation than the title ‘member 
of the audit committee’. Though, all titles are equally-weighted so that ratios lack 
                                                 
42 Bebchuk et al. (2011) find that CEO pay slice is negatively related to firm performance and regard 
agency problems as the reason for their results. They do not find a hump-shaped relation because they do 
not include a squared version of CEO pay slice into their models. 
43 In fact, they address that the number of corporate titles could be influenced by firm performance and 
analyze the impact of the financial crisis in 2008/2009 on their measure as exogenous shock. 
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comparability within firms over time. This cannot be captured by firm-fixed effects and 
thus results in potential endogeneity problems through an omitted variable bias. 
4.2.2 Hypotheses 
Acharya et al. (2011) assume a two-level hierarchy with a CEO at the top and a young 
manager who succeeds him in the next period as CEO. The firm is entirely employee-
financed. At the beginning of the first period t the CEO commits to invest a certain 
fraction of cash flows he obtains from the young manager at the end of the period 
denoted as end-of period capital stock kt. Subsequently, the young manager decides on 
how much effort he exerts to learn about the firm represented by st. Then, cash flows are 
generated the higher st and the higher CEO’s learning effort sCEO was in period t-1 when 
he was the young manager. At the end of period t, investments are made and the CEO 
gets the residual of all generated cash flows that remain after investing some fraction of 
them in the capital stock. In the next period t+1 the CEO leaves the firm and the young 
manager gets promoted to the CEO position. 
Acharya et al. (2011) differentiate three cases for which they infer the optimal capital 
stock at the end of period t. First, in the first best case (FB), the CEO has a long-term 
horizon regarding the firm and the manager internalizes his learning effort meaning that 
he acknowledges that current learning also increases current cash flows, not only future 
cash flows when he is CEO.  
Second, in the constrained efficient case (CE), they also assume a far-sighted CEO, but 
the young manager does not internalize his learning effort so that the CEO must 
incentivize him to exert learning effort by investing in end-of-period capital stock. 
Otherwise, the manager would wait with learning because he ignores current impact of 
his learning on cash flow generation. As Chapter 2 presents, Prendergast (1993) predicts 
this behavior by showing that the employee only profits from current training (i.e., 
learning) if he is provided with promotion incentives which promise a higher wage in 
the next job. The reason for it is that this is the only way the firm can credibly commit 
to compensate for such firm-specific human capital acquisition. In Acharya’s et 
al. (2011) model, the higher wage is the additional cash flow he will be able to 
appropriate privately if he is the next CEO and utilizes the human capital he has 
acquired as young manager. So, Acharya’s et al. (2011) assumption that the young 
manager does not internalize current learning effort is predicted theoretically and my 
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empirical findings in Chapter 2 concerning firm-specific human capital support this 
assumption. 
Third, in the myopic CEO case (MC), the CEO is myopic and the manager does not 
internalize his current learning effort. Then, the CEO is only interested in the cash flows 
he can misappropriate at the end of the first period and does not care about firm value 
after leaving the firm. Since the manager is only interested in the capital stock he will 
inherit in the next period as CEO, he is only willing to exert effort if the CEO invests in 
that capital stock. Hence, that mechanism induces the CEO to invest and not to 
misappropriate cash flows.  
Subsequently, Acharya et al. (2011) introduce the parameter  that represents CEO’s 
contribution to firm’s cash flow relative to the young manager’s contribution. They 
describe such CEO’s contribution as fraction of tasks the CEO undertakes to generate 
cash flows relative to the fraction of the young manager’s tasks. Accordingly, 0  
denotes a situation in which all cash flow generation is decentralized and not influenced 
by the CEO.  
Contrary, in the case of 1 , all cash flow generation is centralized and determined by 
the CEO himself. Analytically, they predict the following relation of CEO’s cash flow 

























where r  is the discount rate, b with 1b  is a parameter for the cash flow production 
function contingent on the learning effort,   is a constant which determines the return 
on the capital stock for one period with 01  b , and denotes the productivity of the 
business environment.  
Acharya et al. (2011) reflect this relation in their proposition: In the case of a myopic 
CEO, firm value represented by the long-term investment in the end-of-period capital 
stock is maximized if CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows is neither very small nor 
very large relative to the young manager’s contribution. 
This finding can be explained economically: If 0 , i.e., the young manager contributes 
to all cash flows in the current period, he is not motivated to exert learning effort and 
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generate cash flows because he will never profit from his learning effort. This is caused 
by Acharya’s et al. (2011) assumption for the constrained efficient case and myopic 
CEO case: The young manager does not internalize his learning effort for current cash 
flow generation. Then, he can only profit from this firm-specific human capital 
acquisition if he is the CEO and generates higher cash flows by utilizing such human 
capital. Since in the case of 0  his cash flow contribution as CEO will also be zero as 
his current CEO also experiences, he knows that human capital he acquires now will not 
influence future cash flows. As a result, he will never be compensated for exerting 
learning effort in the current period and hence he is not willing to incur any learning 
effort costs. Since the current CEO anticipates it, he has no incentive to invest in end-of-
period capital stock. Consequently, the capital stock is minimized. 
The other extreme case is that the CEO contributes all cash flows (i.e., 1 ) now. In 
this case, he does not depend on any learning effort by his young manager and does not 
need to motivate him to learn by investing in end-of-period capital stock. As a result, 
end-of-capital stock is also minimized.  
Between these two extreme CEO’s cash flow contributions both the CEO and the young 
manager can profit from young manager’s learning effort: The CEO now by receiving 
higher cash flows he can partially appropriate privately and the young manager in the 
next period as CEO because the current CEO must invest in end-of-period capital stock 
to motivate the young manager today. 
With regard to this finding, I formulate my first hypothesis: 
H1: The relation of firm’s long-term investments and CEO’s contribution to 
firm’s cash flows is hump-shaped. 
Further, Acharya et al. (2011) compare MCk  with the capital stock in the first best case 
































According to that ratio, they also state in their proposition that in the case of a far-
sighted CEO it is optimal if he alone contributes to all firm’s cash flows to maximize 
firm value (i.e., capital stock) because then the ratio reaches its bottom. Besides, a far-
sighted CEO always invests in the firm’s capital stock so that the young manager is 
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motivated to exert maximum effort regardless of the CEO’s cash flow contribution. 
Hence, the internal governance mechanism conducted by the young manager is not 
necessary.  
If I compare the relation between firm’s long-term investments and CEO’s cash flow 
contribution for a more likely myopic CEO and less likely myopic CEO, I expect that I 
find such relation more likely for the former CEO. 
Consequently, I formulate my second hypotheses as follows: 44 
H2: A hump-shaped relation of firm’s long-term investments and CEO’s 
contribution to firm’s cash flows is more pronounced if the CEO is more likely 
myopic than far-sighted. 
                                                 
44 Aggarwal et al. (2013) analyze similar hypotheses. 
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4.3 Sample description, specification of variables and models 
4.3.1 Sample description 
My sample contains panel data for 73 firms listed in the S&P 500 index in May 2012 
which have at least one CEO change between January 1, 2004 and December 31, 2010 
and the new CEO was promoted from within (i.e., internal promotion). The panel data 
addresses up to four years per firm from 2006 to 2010 excluding the promotion year and 
the years after promotion.  
I analyze only firms with internal promotions to comply with Acharya’s et al. (2011) 
model assumption that the young manager gets promoted for certain. I assume that in 
my selected firms the young managers know very early that they will succeed rendering 
internal governance effective for all periods of time before the actual turnover.45 I 
retrieve the number of business segments and some exercise prices of stock options 
from firms’ annual reports. Accounting data, compensation data, promotion data, and 
data such as CEO age, the existence of a COO, a president, COO-president, CEO-
president, CEO-chairman, COO director and president director is retrieved from either 
the database S&P Capital IQ or a database of the Institute for Finance, Banking and 
Insurance of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology based mostly on data provided by 
firms’ annual reports and S&P Capital IQ. Eventually, I count 140 to 159 firm-years 
with 67-73 firms contingent on the model specification.46 
4.3.2 Specification of variables 
4.3.2.1 Proxy variable for firm’s long-term investments 
As proxy variable for firm’s long-term investments I choose capital expenditures scaled 
by lagged total assets denoted as CAPEX. Aggarwal et al. (2014) also selects the same 
definition of capital expenditures for firm investments. 
Even though Acharya et al. (2011) indicate to research and development expenses as 
measure of long-term investments, I do not choose research and development expenses 
because it would reduce my sample to 53 firm-years because a lot of firms in the service 
sector as Wal-Mart Stores do not report such expenses. Besides, I expect that some 
CEO’s misappropriation such as conducting pet projects can be concealed as those 
                                                 
45 I address the possibility of a selection bias when I discuss my control variables later in this Chapter. 
46 Data for all variables is not available for some years, so that the number of firm-years does not reach 
the theoretically possible number of 124*6 = 744. 
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expenses. In this case, it is a noisy measure of firm’s long-term investments. As a better 
measure I would prefer R&D expense capitalization that follows more verifiable 
accounting standards and is scrutinized by auditors. Since I have no data about it, I only 
choose CAPEX.47 
4.3.2.2 Proxy variable for CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows 
As proxy variable for the CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows I choose the number 
of firm’s reportable operating segments at the beginning of the observed firm-year 
which is represented by the variable NUM_SEG.  
To illustrate my argument for this choice, I assume a firm in which each CEO’s 
subordinated manager leads one operating segment, so that I denote him as segment 
manager.48 So, each segment manager generates cash flows in the segment he is 
assigned to. Hence, he represents only one source of cash flows for the aggregated cash 
flow stream the CEO receives. The young manager in the sense of Acharya et al. (2011) 
is likely one of these managers. This assumption is supported by studies about internal 
promotions (see for surveys on these studies Kesner and Sebora, 1994; Giambatista et 
al., 2005).49  
Now, I consider two situations. First, if there is only one segment, the segment manager 
is the young manager. Then, the young manager is responsible for providing the firm’s 
entire aggregated cash flows. Second, if there are two segments, only one of the two 
segment managers is the young manager.50 Then, the young manager only partially 
contributes to firm’s aggregated cash flows. The other fraction of cash flows is provided 
by a segment manager who will not be promoted to the CEO position and hence does 
not care about firm’s long-term value. Hence, I assume him as more myopic than the 
young manager so that his level of effort to generate cash flows is not influenced by 
CEO’s long-term investments contrary to that Acharya et al. (2011) assumes for the 
young manager. Due to this, I interpret his cash flow contribution as part of CEO’s cash 
flow contribution. 
                                                 
47 Aggarwal et al. (2013) also analyze firm performance measured as Tobin’s Q and return on assets. 
Since I focus on firm investments to have more likely proxy for Acharya’s et al. (2011) capital stock, I do 
not analyze firm performance. 
48 Later, I relax this assumption by analyzing the special case of a Chief Operating Officer as manager. 
49 Cichello et al. (2009), for instance, analyze divisional managers as CEO successors. 
50 I assume that the young manager has been already appointed to make the promotion decision not 
endogenous on segment manager’s behavior. This is consistent with Acharya et al. (2011) who assume 
promotion chance as exogenous. If the firm, for instance, has a COO who is regarded as heir apparent by 
literature (Cannella and Shen, 2001; Bennet and Miles, 2006) this assumption is very realistic. 
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Adopting this argument, if I compare both cases, I draw the following conclusion: The 
young manager’s contribution to firm’s cash flows relative to CEO’s cash flow 
contribution is higher in the first case (100 percent) than in the second case (1 - fraction 
of the other segment manager’s cash flows on firm’s aggregated cash flows). 
Consequently, the number of operating segments provides diversification in the cash 
flows from the CEO’s perspective that makes the CEO less dependent on the young 
manager’s cash flow generation. 
Since Chief Operating Officers (COOs) or non-CEO presidents are often regarded as 
firms’ heirs apparent (Cannella and Shen, 2001; Bennet and Miles, 2006), I also 
interpret them as young managers. Then, one can argue that aforementioned cash flow 
diversification argument does not hold because these young managers provide the entire 
firm’s aggregated cash flows. The reason for it is that they represent an additional 
managerial layer between all segment managers and the CEO (Bennet and Miles, 2006). 
In this case, I argue that the diversification argument also holds because I assume the 
more segments the firm has, the more costly it is for, say, a COO to influence all 
segment managers to make them react on CEO’s long-term investments as the COO 
reacts. The reason for it is that the segment manager who is not the young manager and 
hence is myopic as I outline in my illustration about two segment managers has no 
incentive to adopt the COO’s long-term horizon and due to this must be induced costly 
by the COO. An example that illustrates that alignment of all segment managers to 
COO’s long-term interest can be costly, is that I assume that the COO cannot commit to 
retain some segment managers after getting promoted to the CEO position. In this case, 
the segment manager will not adopt the COO’s long-term horizon. If it gets too costly 
for this COO, he will not influence all segment managers. As a consequence, he 
controls only a fraction of firm’s cash flows resulting in a smaller cash flow 
contribution relative to the CEO whose cash flow contribution comes from cash flows 
generated by the segment managers who are not influenced by the COO.  
Another argument to support my proxy variable choice is based on literature that argues 
that the more segments the firm has the more complex the firm is and hence the more 
able the CEO must be (Rose and Shepard, 1997). To make it an appropriate proxy for 
CEO’s cash flow contribution, CEO’s ability must be better relative to the young 
manager. Hoang and Ruckes (2014), for instance, assume in their theoretical model 
explaining socialism in the case of firm’s capital allocation that CEOs are better 
88 
 
informed about their segments than their segment managers. Since I assume that CEOs 
have determined corporate segment structure by their past investments more likely than 
their young managers, it is likely that these CEOs possess an information advantage 
about their firms’ operations. Consistently, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that CEOs 
undertake CEO-specific investments such as firm diversification to entrench 
themselves. The reason for it is that CEO-specific investments lead to an information 
advantage that prevents shareholders from replacing them if their activities turn out not 
to be shareholder value-maximizing. 
Due to these arguments, I choose the number of operating segments as proxy variable 
for the CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows denoted as NUM_SEG. So, I interpret a 
small number of business segments as a situation in which the CEO’s contribution to 
firm’s cash flows relative the young manager’s contribution is small while a large 
number of business segments indicates a large CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows 
relative to the young manager’s contribution. 
Another advantage of this proxy variable is that the definition of reportable operating 
segments must follow certain objective rules according to the accounting standard FAS 
131. According to the management approach, reportable operating segments should 
reflect the internal reporting structure. Each segment should consist of operations that 
are homogenous in their products, customers, or production technologies and generates 
revenues (i.e., cash flows with external customers) (Alves, 2007). Therefore, it is very 
likely that each segment has its own segment manager who contributes to firm’s cash 
flows from operations with external customers.51 One operating segment has to be 
reported if it contributes materially to the firm’s financial success (e.g., Coenenberg, 
2012). To be material, it should meet two of the following three criteria (Alves, 2007): 
First, its contribution to firm’s revenue exceeds 10 percent of all revenues. Second, its 
contribution to firm’s net profit amounts to more than 10 percent of all profits. Third, its 
total assets contribute to at least 10 percent to firm’s total assets. Though, the firm may 
report operating segments that do not meet these criteria if the management assumes 
that the information is useful and material for shareholder’s decisions (Alves, 2007).  
Nevertheless, some degree of materiality is always required so that the number of 
reportable operating segments likely reflects comparable levels of cash flow 
                                                 
51 For my diversification argument, at least two managers must exist who contribute cash flows 
independently from each other. 
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diversification across firms. Besides, I control for firm-individual preferences for 
segment definitions by applying a firm-fixed effects regression model. This mitigates 
the likelihood of an omitted variable bias that is caused by not controlling precisely for 
the size of each segment.52 
In addition, I observe that only 26.1 percent of all firm-years in the sample include 
changes in the number of operating segments. This finding supports that the number of 
operating segments conveys material information about the structure of the firm’s cash 
flow sources rather than reflecting arbitrary accounting changes that would not reflect 
changes in cash flow diversification. In my sample, operating segments are, for 
instance, subsidiaries that are sold or spun off if they disappear as reportable operating 
segments over time. One example is the pharmaceutical firm Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company which spun off its nutrition subsidiary called Mead Johnson in 2009 and 
consequently reduces his number of reportable operating segments from two to one. 
4.3.2.3 Control variables 
I include some control variables that are potentially correlated with CAPEX or 
NUM_SEG.53 
To control for the existence of a Chief Operating Officer (COO) who can influence 
effectiveness of internal governance on CAPEX, I include a dummy variable NO_COO 
whose value is set to ‘1’ if there is no COO in the firm. I argue that a COO has more 
influence on all segments’ cash flows than a single segment manager as I outline in the 
previous chapter. Since COOs are often CEO successors and hence often regarded as 
heirs apparent (Cannella and Shen, 2001; Bennet and Miles, 2006), they represent likely 
the young manager.  
To account for a CEO who is also president that could mean less influence of a young 
manager on cash flow generation according to the corporate title accumulation 
argument (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2013), I add a dummy variable, CEO_PRES. To control 
that no president exists in the firm, I include the dummy variable NO_PRES whose 
value is set to ‘1’ if the firm does not have a president.  
Since older CEOs are more likely myopic, I include a dummy variable CEO_58 
measuring if the CEO is older than the sample’s median CEO age of 58 years.  
                                                 
52 Rose and Shepard (1997) also apply number of operating segments to measure firm diversification. 
53 The definitions of all variables are shown in Table 4.5 in the appendix. All variables are measured 
either at the firm’s end-of or beginning-of-fiscal year date. 
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I include dummy variables, COO_DIRECTOR or 
NONCEO_PRESIDENT_DIRECTOR to account for the existence of a COO or non-
CEO president who is a member of the board of directors, respectively. In this case, 
these managers can conduct internal governance directly by participating in investment 
decisions. 
Since young and mature firms likely have different governance structures and visibility 
for external monitors, I include the logarithm of firm age represented by 
LN_FIRM_AGE (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2011; Landier et al., 2012). 
Since former firm performance can have an influence on future investments, I include 
lagged Tobin’s Q (i.e., Tobin’s Q at the end of the previous fiscal year), 
TOBINS_Q_LAGGED.54  
In addition, I add lagged capital expenditures (i.e., capital expenditures at the end of the 
previous fiscal the year relative to total asset two fiscal years before), 
CAPEX_LAGGED, into the model because former capital expenditures can influence 
the number of operating segments if the firm, for instance, acquires a company that 
becomes a segment. 
Besides, one can argue that my sample suffers from a selection bias that is represented 
by an omitted variable that reflects firm’s propensity for internal promotions that 
potentially correlates with NUM_SEG. This argument follows Naveen (2006) who 
shows empirically that firm complexity is positively related to internal CEO successions 
that he attributes to a, then, higher value of an internal successor’s firm-specific human 
capital. 
In this case, inclusion of TOBINS_Q_LAGGED and CAPEX_LAGGED alleviate such 
selection bias because they likely capture firm’s propensity for internal promotions (see 
for a survey on this issue Kesner and Sebora, 1994) 
Following corporate governance literature (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2011; Baghat and 
Bolton, 2008; Landier et al., 2012), I include a dummy variable, CEO_CHAIRMAN, 
representing if the CEO is also chairman of the board of directors. Moreover, I add a 
variable, LEVERAGE, reflecting firm’s ratio of total debt to total assets, and the 
logarithm of revenue, LN_REV, and its squared version, LN_REV*LN_REV, as proxy 
                                                 




variables for firm size (e.g., Kale et al., 2009). To account for different annual effects, I 
include fiscal year dummies, YEAR_X.55 
As additional control variable, I add institutional ownership, INSTIT_OWNERSHIP, at 
the beginning of the observed fiscal year as control variable for external governance 
(e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2013). Since diversification of the institutional ownership 
structure can entail free-riding problems that render external governance ineffective 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), I also calculate the Herfindahl index over all institutional 
holdings denoted as INSTIT_DIVERSIFICATION reaching its maximum if ownership 
structure is highly diversified. 
Following Kale et al. (2009), I include CEO alignment, CEO_ALIGNMENT, and 
insider alignment, INSIDERS_ALIGNMENT, at the end of the preceding fiscal year 
(see also Aggarwal, 2013; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Kale et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 
2011).56 Note that INSIDERS_ALIGMENT also includes CEO alignment if it exists. I 
observe that insiders can be firms’ executives, founders, or directors. 
I calculate both variables according to Kale et al. (2009) and Murphy (1999) as follows, 







Accordingly, a value of 1 denote that CEO’s compensation represented by the present 
value of his shares and option he holds in the firm rises by $1 if shareholder value 
increases by $100. INSIDERS_ALIGNMENT is a proxy variable for incentives other 
than promotions incentives for internal governance where CEO_ALIGNMENT is an 
incentive to impose a long horizon on CEO’s investment decisions (Kale et al., 2009). 
4.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics about all variables is shown in Table 4.1.57  
                                                 
55 Since end-of-fiscal year dates vary across firms, I also conduct my analysis with quarter dummy 
variables as robustness analysis. I prefer fiscal year dummies, because due to my small sample size some 
quarter dummies would identify directly the firm. For each fiscal year dummy, I always observe more 
than one firm.  
56 I calculate the option value according to Murphy (1999) with 5-year average volatility of stock returns. 
I exclude four firm-years with alignment values which are implausibly over 100 percent of firm’s market 
capitalization. I obtain free-risk interest rates for 5-year constant maturity treasury bonds from the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (www.federalreserve.gov). 
57 Some variables have 161 observations but most samples in the following estimations only contain 140-
159 observations because of missing values of included variables. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics. Variables are defined as described in Table 4.6. 
Variables Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
CAPEX 161 0.072 0.086 0.003 0.591 
Capital expenditures (in millions of $) 161 1,505.599 3,136.984 19,843 9.2 
CAPEX_LAGGED 161 0.068 0.087 0.001 0.591 
NUM_SEG 161 3.516 1.997 1 9 
NUM_SEG*NUM_SEG 161 16.323 17.783 1 81 
Total assets (in millions of $) 161 27,526.08 39,971.23 899.251 212,949 
Total assets at the end of the previous 
fiscal year (in millions of $) 
161 25,173.85 35,480.62 671.79 161,165 
Revenues (in millions of $) 161 22,212.94 49,503.87 600.828 377,023 
Number of employees  161 65,538.11 227,740.4 596 2,100,000 
Market capitalization (in millions of $) 161 29,868.14 46,346.16 1,440.495 203,204 
Ceo age 161 57.721 4.558 44 68 
CEO_58 161 0.478 0.501 0 1 
Firm age 161 94.155 58.555 8 224 
LN_FIRM_AGE 161 4.140 0.944 0.693 5.384 
CEO_ALIGNMENT 143 6.487 10.098 0.0003 48.774 
INSIDERS_ALIGNMENT 144 15.646 21.769 0.061 87.909 
NO_COO 161 0.571 0.496 0 1 
NO_PRES 161 0.211 0.409 0 1 
NONCEO_PRESIDENT_DIRECTOR 161 0.174 0.380 0 1 
COO_DIRECTOR 161 0.193 0.396 0 1 
CEO_PRES 160 0.419 0.495 0 1 
CEO_CHAIRMAN 160 0.725 0.448 0 1 
INSTIT_OWNERSHIP 161 0.473 0.132 0.048 0.886 
INSTIT_DIVERSIFICATION 161 0.932 0.051 0.587 0.978 
LN_REV 161 9.004 1.343 6.398 12.840 
LN_REV*LN_REV 161 82.870 25.057 40.938 164.867 
LEVERAGE 161 0.238 0.157 0 0.702 
TOBINS_Q_LAGGED 161 2.282 1.531 0.956 12.012 
2-year lagged volatility of stock returns 
(in percent) 
159 25.290 9.792 10.784 60.141 
LN_VOLA_LAGGED (2-year average) 159 0.223 0.076 0.102 0.471 
Fiscal year 2010 161 0.006 0.079 0 1 
Fiscal year 2009 161 0.230 0.422 0 1 
Fiscal year 2008 161 0.124 0.331 0 1 
Fiscal year 2007 161 0.335 0.474 0 1 
Fiscal year 2006 161 0.304 0.462 0 1 
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The firms report on average over all firm-years revenues of $22,212.94 million, total 
assets of $27,526.08 million and 65,538 employees.58 Their capital expenditures amount 
to $1,505.599 million on average. 
CEOs are on average 57.72 years old and 47.8 percent of all CEO are older than 58 
years while firms themselves are on average 94.16 years old. 
Firms have on average 3.52 reportable operating segments ranging from 1 to 9.  
On the contrary, 41.8 percent of all firm-years include firms with CEOs who are 
presidents. 57.1 percent of all firm-years do not exhibit a COO, whereas 21.1 percent do 
not include any president. 
19.3 percent of all firm-years refer to firms which have COOs who are members of the 
board of directors. 17.4 percent of all firm-years have non-CEO presidents on their 
boards. 
72.5 percent of all firm-years show firms with CEOs who are also chairman of the 
board of directors showing that external governance is likely weak in most of my 
sample firms. 
CEO alignment is $6.49 per $100 shareholder value increase whereas insiders’ 
alignment amounts to $15.64 per $100 shareholder value increase. Institutional 
investors hold 47.3 percent of all equity while institutional ownership diversification is 
high indicated by a value of 0.93 close to 1. 
Before estimation, I estimate a Pearson correlation matrix of all independent variables 
to check for multicollinearity problems (exhibited in Table 4.2). The correlation 
coefficients do not reach critical levels above 0.8 (see for a thorough analysis about 
multicollinearity Mason and Perreault, 1991). Moreover, variance inflation factors (vfi) 
are below 10 for the all variables of interest (except if squared versions are included) 
(Kennedy, 2008). Therefore, I conclude that my analysis does not suffer from 
multicollinearity problems. 
 
                                                 
58 All means and standard deviations are calculated for all firm-years. 
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Table 4.2: Correlation matrix. Variables are defined as described in Table 4.6. Sample of 140 firm-years (M1 (4)) is applied here. Asterisks denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 CAPEX 1               
2 NUM_SEG -0.084 1              
3 NUM_SEG*NUM_SEG -0.038 0.959 1             
4 CAPEX_LAGGED 0.924 -0.093 -0.045 1            
5 CEO_58 -0.107 0.146* 0.137* -0.73 1           
6 NO_COO 0.096 -0.110 -0.098 0.106 -0.126 1          
7 NO_PRES -0.097 0.042 0.064 -0.062 0.114 0.079 1         
8 COO_DIRECTOR -0.010 -0.071 -0.068 -0.002 0.069 -0.564*** -0.060 1        
9 NONCEO_PRES_DIRECTOR 0.063 -0.045 -0.059 0.043 -0.013 -0.331*** -0.237 0.649*** 1       
10 CEO_PRES 0.111 -0.097 -0.110 0.119 -0.072 0.448*** -0.441 -0.278*** -0.391*** 1      
11 CEO_CHAIRMAN -0.051 0.167 0.113 -0.084 0.117 -0.282*** 0.286*** 0.196** 0.284*** -0.579*** 1     
12 INSTIT_OWNERSHIP -0.005 -0.013 0.035 0.008 -0.097 -0.039 -0.053 0.230** 0.115 -0.079 0.051 1    
13 INSTIT_DIVERSIFICATION -0.096 0.171** 0114 -0.076 -0.018 0.133* 0.164 -0.272*** -0.216*** 0.043 0.097 -0.341*** 1   
14 CEO_ALIGNMENT -0.067 -0.109 -0.048 -0.049 -0.233*** 0.198** -0.049 -0.133 -0.121 0.056 -0.200** 0.010 -0.033 1  
15 INSIDERS_ALIGNMENT 0.015 -0.120 -0.037 0.015 -0.158* 0.192** -0.098 -0.137 -0.127 0.101 -0.261*** -0.039 -0.060 0.951*** 1 
16 LN_REV -0.219*** 0.378*** 0.345*** -0.194** 0.110 0.010 0.261*** -0124 -0.019 -0.190** 0.258*** -0.087 0.294*** -0.293*** -0.359*** 
17 LN_REV*LN_REV -0.191** 0.358*** 0.329*** -0.167** 0.103 0.021 0.271*** -0.129 -0.026 -0.186** 0.240*** -0.096 0.293*** -0.279*** -0.342*** 
18 LEVERAGE -0.038 0.286*** 0.226*** -0.035 0.018 0.023 -0.029 -0.061 0.052 0.050 0.145* -0.133* 0.025 -0.218*** -0.265*** 
19 TOBINS_Q_LAGGED -0.004 -0.239*** -0.232*** -0.045 -0.022 -0.153* 0.082 0.094 -0.101 -0.106 -0.148* 0.061 -0.175** 0.311*** 0.351*** 





Table 4.2 cond’t 
 16 17 18 19 20 
1 CAPEX      
2 SEGMENT_NUMBER      
3 SEGMENT_NUMBER*      
4 CAPEX_LAGGED      
5 CEO_58      
6 NO_COO      
7 NO_PRES      
8 COO_DIRECTOR      
9 NONCEO_PRES_DIRECTOR      
10 CEO_PRES      
11 CEO_CHAIRMAN      
12 INSTIT_OWNERSHIP      
13 INSTIT_DIVERSIFICATION      
14 CEO_ALIGNMENT      
15 INSIDERS_ALIGNMENT      
16 LN_REV 1     
17 LN_REV*LN_REV 0.996*** 1    
18 LEVERAGE 0.016 0.001 1   
19 TOBINS_Q_LAGGED -0.370*** -0.341*** -0.334*** 1  





4.3.4 Specification of models 
4.3.4.1 Hypothesis 1 















If NUM_SEG59 exhibits a positive and statistically significant coefficient and 
NUM_SEG*NUM_SEG a negative and statistically significant coefficient, H1 is 
confirmed reflecting that the relation of firm’s long-term investments and CEO’s 
contribution to firm’s cash flows is hump-shaped. I calculate clustered robust standard 
errors for all variables by choosing a firm identifier variable as cluster variable (see for 
the necessity of clustered robust standard errors Petersen, 2009). A Hausman (1978) 
specification test indicates that a fixed effects regression model is more preferable than 
a random effects model. I control for firm-fixed effects to mitigate endogeneity 
concerns about NUM_SEG that some firm-fixed effects could capture number of 
segments: The firm, for instance, could have some time-invariant preferences in their 
annual reports for defining operating segments or the level of transparency w.r.t. job 
titles that are factored out by the firm-fixed approach. 
4.3.4.2 Hypothesis 2 
To test H2, I argue that a CEO whose compensation is highly sensitive to shareholder 
value is more aligned with shareholder’s interest and thus is more far-sighted than a 
CEO with less sensitivity. Consequently, I split my sample including all valid alignment 
variables (sample size = 140) in two subsamples, representing high CEO alignment and 
low CEO alignment, respectively. As cutoff value I choose the median of 
CEO_ALIGNMENT (i.e., $1.261 per $100 shareholder value increase).60 Then, I also 
apply M1 for each subsample, then called M2 (1) (CEO alignment < median CEO 
alignment) and M2 (2) (CEO alignment >= median CEO alignment). If I observe a 
statistically significant hump-shaped relation for the subsample of low CEO alignment 
(M2 (1)) whereas no statistically significant relation for the high CEO alignment group 
(M2 (2)), H2 is confirmed that a hump-shaped relation of firm’s long-term investments 
and CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows is more pronounced if the CEO is more 
likely myopic than far-sighted. 
                                                 
59 In the text, I do not use the subscripts of the variables. 
60 Aggarwal et al. (2013) choose as cutoff value five percent to differentiate between the two CEO types. 
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4.4 Empirical results and their discussion 
4.4.1 Empirical results 
4.4.1.1 Hypothesis 1 
The results for M1 are depicted in Table 4.3. M1 (1) excludes the squared versions of 
NUM_SEG to show that there is no statistically significant linear relation of the number 
of segments and capital expenditures.  
In M1 (2), I include the squared version of NUM_SEG but exclude 
CEO_ALIGNMENT and INSIDER_ALIGNMENT to have slightly larger sample size 
(159) and more firms (73). In M1 (3), I include CEO_ALIGNMENT, and in M1 (4), 
CEO_ALIGNMENT and INSIDER_ALIGNMENT. 
In all specifications with NUM_SEG*NUM_SEG, I observe a positive coefficient on 
NUM_SEG and a negative one on NUM_SEG*NUM_SEG. In M1 (3) and M1 (4), all 
corresponding coefficients are statistically significant at the five percent level whereas 
in M1 (2) the coefficient on NUM_SEG is statistically significant at the ten percent 
level and NUM_SEG*NUM_SEG also at the five percent level. All findings confirm 
H1 that the relation of firm’s long-term investments and CEO’s contribution to firm’s 
cash flows is hump-shaped. 
4.4.1.2 Hypothesis 2 
The results for M2 for both subsamples are shown in Table 4.4. 
For the subsample of low CEO alignment in M2 (1) (i.e., more likely myopic CEOs), I 
observe again the hump-shaped relation of firm’s long-term investments and CEO’s 
contribution to firm’s cash flows reflected by the positive coefficient on NUM_SEG 
(significant at p < 0.10) and negative one on NUM_SEG*NUM_SEG (significant at p < 
0.10).  
For the subsample of high CEO alignment in M2 (2) (i.e., more likely far-sighted 
CEOs), I observe no statistically significant coefficients on NUM_SEG and 
NUM_SEG*NUM_SEG. Hence, I cannot document a hump-shaped relation of firm’s 
long-term investments and CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows.61 
                                                 
61 Aggarwal et al. (2013) also apply this approach and concludes that insignificance in the one group and 
significance in the other as indication that the effect is more pronounced in the latter group. 
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Table 4.3: Main models for Hypothesis 1. Variables are defined as described in Table 
4.6. Standard errors are clustered robust with a firm identifier as cluster variable and 
reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 0.01(***), 
0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level.  
 M1 (1) M1 (2) M1 (3) M1 (4) 
Sample Entire sample Entire sample Entire sample Entire sample 













































































































































Time dummy variables Fiscal years Fiscal years Fiscal years Fiscal years 









#Firm-years 159 159 141 140 
#Firms 73 73 62 62 
R2 within 0.2314 0.2385 0.2861 0.2902 
R2 between 0.0126 0.0175 0.0456 0.0452 




Table 4.4: Main models for Hypothesis 2. Variables are defined as described in Table 
4.6. Standard errors are clustered robust with a firm identifier as cluster variable and 
reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 0.01(***), 
0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level.  
 M2 (1) M2 (2) 
Sample Low CEO alignment High CEO alignment 













































































Time dummy variables Fiscal years Fiscal years 





#Firm-years 70 70 
#Firms 34 34 
R2 within 0.6345 0.6580 
R2 between 0.0603 0.1103 
R2 overall 0.1358 0.1358 
These findings confirm H2 that a hump-shaped relation of firm’s long-term investments 
and CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows is more pronounced if the CEO is more 
likely myopic than far-sighted.  
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4.4.2 Comparison of empirical results with model predictions 
To plot my findings from M1 (4) regarding the internal governance mechanism, I 
calculate the relation of firm’s long-term investments and CEO’s contribution to firm’s 
cash flows as follows: 
SEGNUMSEGNUMSEGNUMCAPEX M _*01906,0_*_*00192,0)4(1  , 
where NUM_SEG ranges from 1 to 9 segments as my descriptive statistics show. To 
















 ,  
where 01714,01*01906,01*1*00192,01_@)4(1 SEGNUMMCAPEX . 
The plot is depicted in Figure 4.1. The plot shows the hump-shaped relation of firm’s 
long-term investments and CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows.  
Similarly, I plot the hump-shaped relation for the subsample of likely myopic CEOs 

















As a benchmark, I also analyze the theoretical capital stock the CEO invests at the end 
of the first period, i.e., MCk , according to Acharya’s et al. (2011) prediction with the 
parameters 4286.1b , 1 , 2.0 , and 05.0r  which they also choose in their 
paper (Acharya et al., 2011, p. 710) as follows: 
                                                 
62 Note that the subsample applied in M2 (1) only counts 7 operational segments so that segments 8 and 9 


































































  denotes myopic CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows 
with 9_ max SEGNUM  to comply with Acharya’s et al. (2011) interval for  .  
Since I intend to compare the plot of my empirical findings with those model 






























































































Then, I also plot )2011.(aletAcharyaCAPEX  in Figure 4.1.  
All three plots show the hump-shaped relation between firm’s long-term investments 
and CEO’s contribution to firm’s cash flows.  
The results from M1(4) and M2 (1) have a correlation coefficient of 0.4586 that shows 
that controlling for the horizon of the CEO influences my findings, but does not change 
the underlying hump-shape.63 
 
 
                                                 
63 Interestingly, the correlation coefficient of the results from M2 (1) and the theoretical model with a 
value of 0.9803 is very high. In addition, both curves have a peak at a number of segments of 3. Since the 
curve of the theoretical model depends on parameter choice, I take this finding with caution. 
Nevertheless, it could indicate that controlling for CEO’s horizon is profitable. 
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4.5 Robustness Analyses 
4.5.1 Variable specifications concerns 
Since I observe that very few annual reports lack data about the management team 
concerning NO_COO, NO_PRES, COO_DIRECTOR, PRESIDENT_DIRECTOR, 
CEO_PRES, and CEO_CHAIRMAN, these control variables can be biased by an 
omitted variable that measures firms propensity to report that data. I do not regard it as a 
problem for my main models, because such propensity should be filtered out due to the 
applied firm-fixed effects model. Nevertheless, as robustness analysis, I provide an 
estimation of M1 (4) denoted as M3 without these variables. Then, my results remain 
qualitatively unchanged (depicted in Table 4.5). 
Another variable specification concern can be that FISCAL_YEAR_X is biased by an 
omitted variable measuring that some firms’ fiscal years do not end at December, 31. To 
address this concern, I define quarter-year dummy variables based on quarters of all 
calendar years and estimate M1 (4) denoted as M4 with these year-quarter dummies. 
Then, I yield the same qualitative results as with the original model M1 (4) (shown in 
Table 4.5). These findings show that some endogeneity concerns about my control 
variables caused by possible omitted variable biases do not change my results. 
4.5.2 Financial diversification  
The number of operational segments conveys information about cash flow 
diversification form the CEO’s perspective. It can also be seen from the investors’ 
perspective. Then, one can argue that such diversification can, for instance, decrease the 
credit default risk of firm’s bonds. This can lead to better financial strength to undertake 
more investments.  
Hence, the number of segments is partially positively related to CAPEX, because it 
reflects financial strength rather than CEO’s cash flow contribution. Since I control for 
TOBINS_Q_LAGGED and CAPEX_LAGGED, I suggest that my analysis should be 
robust against such interpretation.  
Nevertheless, to rule out more likely such interpretation, I include in M1 (4) the 
logarithm of the 2-year average volatility of firm’s stock returns at the end of the 
preceding fiscal year (Kale et al., 2009) denoted as LN_VOLA_LAGGED to account 
for diversification effects that increase financial strength. 
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Then, my results remain qualitatively unchanged (depicted in Table 4.5). This finding 
indicates that the number of reportable operating segments does not likely refer to 


























Table 4.5: Robustness analyses. Variables are defined as described in Table 4.6. Standard errors are 
clustered robust with a firm identifier as cluster variable and reported in parentheses. Asterisks denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*)-level.  
 M3 M4 M5 
Sample Base sample Base sample Base sample 









































































































Time dummy variables Fiscal years Quarters of calendar 
years 
Fiscal years 







#Firm-years 142 140 140 
#Firms 62 62 62 
R2 within 0.2591 0.3005 0.3095 
R2 between 0.0443 0.0404 0.0431 




Acharya et al. (2011) show in their theoretical model that a manager below the CEO 
rank who will be promoted to the CEO position in the next period is only induced to 
generate cash flows if his CEO does not misappropriate firm assets and undertakes 
long-term investments instead. 
Consistently, I document that the relation of firm’s long-term investments and CEO’s 
contribution to firm’s cash flows is hump-shaped. In addition, I find that this relation is 
more pronounced if the sensitivity of CEO’s compensation to shareholder value is not 
too high and thus he is likely myopic. 
Suggestions for future research 
My analysis provides some implications for future research. First, my sample size is 
small. It should be extended with more firms and even with firms which do not 
experience internal promotions. Second, following Rose and Shepard (1997), the 
Herfindahl index for operating segments based on their revenues or profits should be 
applied to measure CEO’s cash flow contribution because this measure is likely more 
related to my cash flow diversification arguments. Third, as an alternative measure for 
firm’s long-term investments I suggest research and development expense capitalization 
because it follows more verifiable accounting standards and is scrutinized by auditors 
than R&D expenses in the income statement. This measure is, therefore, less likely 
biased by pet projects disguised as research projects.  
Acharya’s et al. (2011) idea that promotion incentives motivate a manager below the 
CEO rank to conduct tasks of internal governance has some managerial implications. 
According to their theory, all that shareholders must do is to choose the right heir 
apparent at the right time.  
To begin with the right heir apparent, since the relation of CEO’s and heir apparent’s 
cash flow contribution must be balanced to maximize firm value, shareholders should 
search for an heir apparent with such a balanced contribution. For my sample, I conduct 
further analysis about the realization of promotions. Most of them are COOs or non-
CEO president (66.67 percent) whereas only 7.7 percent of promoted managers are 
Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) that is consistent with literature (e.g., Kesner and 
Sebora, 1994; Giambatista et al., 2005). In this context, it would be interesting to extend 
Acharya’s et al. (2011) model to Chief Financial Officers who might contribute cash 
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flows from financing activities that compete with operating cash flows. Maybe, a CFO 
contributes more to cash flows relative to the CEO, if he has specific knowledge about 
financial contracts. In addition, I find that the relation of CEO’s contribution to firm’s 
cash flows measured by NUM_SEG and the COO’s or non-CEO president’s promotion 
chance is also hump-shaped. This finding indicates that those managers are supposed to 
conduct tasks of internal governance. Since only few management literature (Zhang, 
2006) refer to such tasks and even COOs themselves do not mention them (Bennet and 
Miles, 2006), it would be fruitful for future research to explore this idea empirically. 
Since Acharya et al. (2011) assume that the young manager’s promotion is certain and 
not endogenous, their model cannot explain this finding. So, it is left to future research 
to extend their model with an endogenous promotion chance, maybe by modeling 
competing young managers.64 
About the right timing of selecting an heir apparent, I expect the following trade-off: If 
shareholders choose him too early, it is a signal to the CEO that his dismissal 
approaches and thus make him myopic in his investment behavior. If they select him too 
late, the CEO could misappropriate too many firm assets before. Consequently, it would 
be interesting for future research to determine the optimal timing for selecting the heir 
apparent. 
To take it to a broader view, Acharya’s et al. (2011) model and my empirical approach 
are applicable to other types of CEO-young manager alike relationships such as division 
managers and their deputies, or deans and their professors. 
                                                 





Table 4.6: Definitions of variables. 
Variable Definition 
CAPEX 
Capital expenditures in year t / total assets in year t-1 
NUM_SEG 
Number of reportable operating segments 
CAPEX_LAGGED 
capital expenditures in fiscal year t-1 / total assets in year t-2 
CEO_58 
Dummy variable set to ‘1’ if the CEO is older than 58 years 
NO_COO 
Dummy variable set to ‘1’ if the firm does not report a COO 
NO_PRES 
Dummy variable set to ‘1’ if the firm does not report a president 
COO_DIRECTOR Dummy variable set to ‘1’ if the firm reports a COO who is 
director 
NONCEO_PRES_DIRECTOR Dummy variable set to ‘1’ if the firm reports a non-CEO 
president who is director 
CEO_PRES Dummy variable set to ‘1’ if the firm reports a CEO who is 
president 
CEO_CHAIRMAN Dummy variable set to ‘1’ if the firm reports a CEO who is 
chairman of the board of directors 
INSTIT_OWNERSHIP Number of holdings held by institutional investors in year t-1 / 
stocks outstanding in year t-1 
INSTIT_DIVERSIFICATION Herfindahl index of holdings held by institutional investors in 
year t-1 
CEO_ALIGNMENT 
CEO alignment in year t-1 
INSIDERS_ALIGNMENT 
Insiders’ alignment (also including CEO alignment) in year t-1 
LN_VOLA_LAGGED Logarithm of 2-year volatility of stock returns in year t-1 in 
percent 
LN_REV 
Logarithm of revenues 
LEVERAGE 
Total debt / total assets 
TOBINS_Q_LAGGED Tobin’s Q in year t-1 = (market capitalization in year t-1 + total 
assets in year t-1 – book value of equity in year t-1-deferred 
taxes in year t-1)/total assets in year t-1  
LN_FIRM_AGE 






The dissertation contributes empirical findings to three research questions motivated by 
problems that firms and employees encounter during the lifecycle of human capital. 
Research question RQ1 
Chapter 2 addresses the research question RQ1 how firms motivate their employees to 
acquire firm-specific and general human capital. I document empirically that promotion 
incentives are positively related to nonverifiable firm-specific human capital acquisition 
whereas I find no relation of individual performance pay and such acquisition. On the 
contrary, I show that individual performance pay is positively related to general human 
capital acquisition whereas I find no relation of promotion incentives with such 
acquisition.  
I suggest that future research tracks employees over time in a panel data set to reveal 
their investment dynamics in human capital and control for employee- and firm-fixed 
effects. One additional interesting finding of the dissertation is that the positive relation 
of individual performance pay and job-specific human capital acquisition. This finding 
motivates further research to explore why in this case an individual performance pay 
contract seems to be feasible. 
Research question RQ2 
Chapter 3 addresses the research question how firms learn about employees’ human 
capital. I find empirically that firm’s uncertainty about employees’ job-specific human 
capital is positively related to adoption of job rotation. Further, I document that the firm 
also adopts job rotation if it is uncertain about job-specific nonhuman capital or if 
employees’ job performance is influenced by an exogenous shock.  
Since the study lacks employees’ performance data, I suggest that future research 
analyzes the combined effect of the adoption of job rotation and firms’ uncertainty 
about employees’ job-specific human capital on job performance. 
Research question RQ3 
Chapter 4 addresses the research question how firms alleviate moral hazard problems 
caused by CEO’s discretion due to their high value of human capital. I contribute to the 
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recent strand of literature about internal governance by documenting empirically in 
selected S&P 500 firms that the relation of firm’s long-term investments and CEO’s 
contribution to firm’s cash flows is hump-shaped as predicted theoretically by 
Acharya’s et al. (2011). In addition, I find that this hump-shaped relation is more 
pronounced if the CEO is likely myopic.  
I suggest that the study of the dissertation is the starting point for several research 
projects. First, since subordinated managers usually compete against each other for the 
CEO job (Bognanno, 2001), it would be interesting to incorporate such tournaments in 
Acharya’s et al. (2011) model as Acharya et al. (2011) also suggests in their conclusion. 
Second, future research should explore theoretically when internal governance should 
be triggered by a succession plan defined by shareholders because there is the trade-off 
that succession plans make incumbent CEOs myopic whereas heirs apparent discipline 
them. Third, I suggest that empirical research should examine if the selection of 
different types of executives as heirs apparent provide different outcomes that are not 
captured by Acharya et al. (2011). For example, if a CFO is considered as CEO 
successor, it is interesting how his contribution to firm’s cash flows by designing 
financial contracts influence CEO’s investment behavior. Last, the idea of internal 
governance should be examined empirically for all ranks in firms. 
To conclude, a firm cannot simply acquire or evaluate human capital as it can do with 
nonhuman capital because the firm never possesses human capital because it is tied to 
employees who are free to leave the firm (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1994). Besides, it is 
often nonverifiable. As I outline in the dissertation, these characteristics of human 
capital entail moral hazard or evaluation problems which the firm can solve by using 
certain incentive and job designs. Since human beings are complex, I expect that in 
reality these designs also become complex. Due to this complexity, I expect that 
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